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REPARATIONS AND THE "MODEL 
MINORITY" IDEOLOGY OF 
ACQUIESCENCE: THE NECESSITY TO 
REFUSE THE RETURN TO ORIGINAL 
HUMILIATION 
CHRIS K. 1IJIMA * 
Any attempt to "soften" the power of the op/Jressor in deference 
to the weakness of the oppressed almost always manifests itself in 
the form of false generosity; indeed, the attemjJt never goes beyond 
this. In order to have the continued opportunity to express their 
''generosity, " the oppressors must perpetuate injustice as well. An 
unjust social order is the permanent fount of this ''generosity,'' 
which is nourished by death, despair, and poverty. That is why the 
dispensers of false generosity become desjJerate at the slightest threat 
to its source. 
True generosity consists precisely in fighting to destroy the causes 
which nourish false charity. True generosity lies in striving so that 
... [people's] hands-whether of individuals or entire peoples-
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need to be extended less and less in supplication, so that more and 
more they become human hands which . .. transform the world. I 
PROLOGUE 
My friend Legan sent me an e-mail describing a conversation his 
wife, Tomie, had while she was working on an artistic project in Poston, 
Arizona. Tomie, a much respected activist and artist, had been asked 
to create art work inspired by her interactions with two communities 
in Poston2-theJapanese-American and the Native American. I reprint 
his e-mail post here almost verbatim: 
Well, Tomie came home earlier this week. She had a busy 
but wonderful and moving experience with the Japanese and 
Native American communities. One story she told me, really 
shows how the Native Americans got fi'cked over by this 
country. When they first started bringing in theJAs (Japanese 
Americans] to Poston, the gov't forgot to tell the tribe that 
they were putting them on their reservation. The next thing 
they know, army trucks are invading their reservations . . . 
bringing in all these building supplies and fencing in part of 
their lands. When the elders asked what was going on, they 
were told that they were bringing in Japanese spies to lock 
them up for the duration of the war. Finally, an agreement 
was made that once the war was over, the land would be 
returned to its original state. As the JAs started to move in, 
the NA [Native Americans] were seeing "nice" wooden bar-
racks with indoor plumbing being constructed. Truck loads 
of fresh fruit and vegetables and supplies were being shipped 
in. The NAs were thinking, hey ... these spies are living in 
better conditions than we are. Later, they were seeing the JAs 
building fish ponds in front of their barracks and growing 
flowers and developing crops. Something the NAs were never 
able to do, because they were not farmers, but sheep and 
cattle herders. A mini paradise was being developed in front 
of their eyes behind the barb wire fences. 
Finally, thanks go to my family: my wife Jane, my mothet' Razu, and my dad Takeru, for their 
inspiration and encouragement to continue fighting for equity and justice, to the Japanese-Ameri-
can community who survived and prevailed over our collective incarceration, and to the many 
activists, lawyers and community people of all colm'S who struggled to make redress a reality. 
t PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 28-29 (Myra Bergman Ramos trans" 1972). 
2 Poston, Arizona was a site of one of the internment camps for Japanese Americans during 
World War II. 
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When the war was over and the JAs left, instead of turning 
over the barracks (with real plumbing) and leaving the trees, 
flowers, and crops and giving them to the NAs; the gov't in 
accordance to their agreement with the elders, plowed every-
thing over. They dug these huge ditches and buried all the 
wood, plumbing, etc. 
When the army left, the NAs began to dig up these ditches 
to try to salvage all of these building supplies. The army found 
out and arrested many of them and reburied it and put tons 
of rock and boulders on it so the NAs couldn't get at it. It 
became real easy to understand why the NAs had such a 
resentment about the JAs (they were living better than they 
were and also they were fiercely patriotic).3 
387 
The ironies present in these circumstances-a concentration 
camp for citizens imprisoned as foreign aliens built on land that served 
as a prison for original inhabitants created by conquering invaders, 
those imprisoned outside the barbed wire wanting what was inside, 
those inside the barbed wire wishing they were outside of it-would be 
poetic if not so tragic. But as I read the e-mail, I realized that this sad 
story of the past was a metaphor for an equally sad future if the lessons 
of internment and redress were not heeded. 
INTRODUCTION 
A few years ago when they had reached their seventies, my parents, 
like other Nisei, received $20,000 from the United States in payment 
for their incarceration during World War 11.4 Needless to say, I have no 
personal problem with the concept of their receiving individual mone-
tary reparations. Indeed, the amount given to them was very little 
recompense for the fear, time, humiliation, and material loss that 
relocation wreaked upon them, their families, and community.5 The 
Purple Heart my father received in Italy provided little solace for the 
3 E-mail from Legan Wong to Chris K. Iijima, Assistant Professor of Law, William S. Richard-
son School of Law, University of Hawai'i (Nov. 23, 1997) (on file with author). 
4 On August 10, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed H.R. 442, the Civil Liberties Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50 U.s.c. app. § 1989 (1990)) [hereinafter 
"The Civil Liberties Act" or "Act" or "redress bill" or "bill"]. 
5 On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 which, 
in effect, excluded all persons of Japanese ancestry from residing on the ""est Coast of the United 
States. The vast majority of those interned were Issei and Nisei. My parents are "Nisei"-American 
born Japanese Americans. My grandparents are "Issei," the immigrant generation. l\!y generation 
is the third, "Sansei." There were also "Kibei," \I'ho were American born but were sent overseas 
for education. 
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friends he lost in the battlefields and dirt roads of Europe, fighting for 
a nation that had locked away their families. The money was deserved, 
yet small compensation for an outrage motivated by racial hysteria and 
fueled by a history of racial paranoia. 
The source of my discomfort is more long range. As one Mrican-
American scholar described her ambivalent reaction to the news of 
Japanese-American reparations: 
The apology was so appropriate and the payment so justified, 
however insufficient it was, that the source of my ambivalent 
reaction was at first difficult to identify. Mter some introspec-
tion, I guiltily discovered that my sentiments were related to 
a very dark, brooding feeling that I had fought long and hard 
to conquer-inferiority. A feeling that took first root in the 
soil of "Why them and not me?"6 
Indeed, there has been a long history of attempts by Mrican 
Americans to attain redress not only for slavery, but also for its effects.7 
However, there has been little congressional support. On November 
20, 1989, Congressman John Conyers introduced House Resolution 
3745 calling for a commission to examine the institution of slavery-de 
Although I am aware of the implications and power of terminology, I purposefully use certain 
terms loosely and interchangeably. For example, I refelo to the camps as "internment camps," 
"relocation camps," "loelocation centers," or "concentration camps." I refer to the extraordinary 
movement to redress the camp experience as "redress," and sometimes I refer to the money 
damages as "reparations" even though I know that some might consider the term "reparations" 
as implying that money damages paid to American citizens for constitutional violations are 
equivalent to money paid to non-Americans as wartime loeparations. I use the words interchange-
ably simply because to me they signifY the same things-camp=prison and redress/repara-
tions=justiceo 
6 Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear it: An Analysis of Reparations to African Amelicans, 
67 TULo L. RE\". 597, 647 (1993). 
i See id. at 600-07. Professor Verdun chronicles the various attempts at reparations for African 
Americans from the end of the Civil War, to the Black Manifesto in the 1960s demanding $500 
million dollars from churches and synagogues, to the claims for land and loeparations by those 
such as the Nation of Islam and Queen Mother Moore, to the National Coalition of Blacks for 
-Reparations as well as bills relating to reparations introduced in Congress and in state legislatures. 
See id; see also BORIS BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973) (loeviewing the potential 
legal theories for and obstacles to loeparations for African Americans); Rhonda V. Magee, The 
Alaster's Tools From the Bottom Up: Responses to African-Ame/lcan Reparations Theory in Mainstream 
and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REv. 863, 876-92 (1993) (reviewing the history of the 
attempts for reparations fOlo African Americans). 
In 1995, the Florida ·state legislature awarded $150,000 to each of nine survivOl"s, as well as 
other monetary awards to 143 descendants, ofa Black community in Rosewood, Florida, burned 
dO\\11 by a rioting white mob in 1923. Lori S. Robinson, Righting a Wrong Among Black Ammcans, 
the Debate is Escalating Over l'v'hether an Apology fur Slavery is Enough, SEATTLE POST-INTELLI-
GENCER,June 29,1997, at El. 
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jure and de facto discrimination against Mrican Americans.s While it 
continues to languish in congressional committee purgatory, Conyers 
has unsuccessfully renewed his bill in every Congress since 1989.<) 
The simple notion of a national apology for slavery has raised 
much controversy. On June 12, 1997, Congressman Tony Hall in tro-
duced a house resolution calling for an apology to those who suffered 
as slaves under the Constitution and laws of the United States. 10 The re-
sponse was quick and overwhelmingly negative. A national poll found 
that 61 % of the people polled disfavored a congressional apology for 
slavery, even as Blacks favored the apology by a two-to-one margin.]] 
Even Congressman Hall, the sponsor of the resolution, was "stunned" 
at the amount and level of criticism of his proposal.12 Perhaps what was 
most striking about the reaction to the apology proposal was the 
immediate dismissal by Congress and the President of any considera-
tion of Black reparations. 13 Even during the debate over Japanese-
R H.R. 3745 reads in relevant part: 
A bill to acknowledge the fundamental injustice, cruelty, brutality and inhumanity 
of slavery in the United States and the Thirteen American Colonies between 1619 
and 1685 and to establish a commission to examine the institution of sla\'ery, 
subsequent de jure and de facto racial and economic discrimination against Afri-
can-Americans, and the impact of these forces on living African Americans, to make 
recommendations to the Congress on appropriate remedies, and for other purposes 
H.R. 3745, WIst Congo (1989). 
9 In 1991, Conyers enlisted 19 other Representath'es as co-sponsors of the bill, H.R. 1684. 
137 CONGo REc. H2134 (1991). See Scott Shepard, Slallel)' Apology Plan Raises Reparations Issue, 
THE ATLANTA CONST.,june 12, 1997, atA6 (stating that Com'ers has reintroduced his commission 
legislation in every session of Congress since 1989); Robinson, supra note 7 (same); jill Zucker-
man & Brian McGrory, TaUI of Apologizing for Slallel), Spmks Debate on Effica0', THE BOSTON 
GLOBE,june 17,1997, atAl (same). 
10 See H.R Res. 96, 105th Congo (1997). 
II See Paul Leavitt & Robert Silvers, Poll; Congress Shouldn't Make Apolog)' for Slm1f'1J, VSA 
TODAy,July 2,1997, at A5 (citing a USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup poll). The math indicates that if 
approximately 66% of Blacks polled were in favor, then the percentage of whites disfamring an 
apology must have been significantly higher than 61 %. See id, 
12 See Michael A. Fletcher, For Americans, Nothing is Simple About iHaking Apolog)' for SlallelJ; 
Congressman's Suggestion Draws Fire From All Sides, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1997, at AI. The 
article reports that Hall concedes his idea is "virtually dead," that he has received hundreds of 
letters and phone messages "most[ly] condemning his idea, often with harsh racial language." 
See id. Indeed, the range of negative sentiments have been expressed in statements ad\'ocating 
for apologies to those who were stripped of their slaves, as ,,'ell as in assertions promoting the 
notion that thanks should be given to the sla\'e traders who "rescued" sla\'es from Africa. See id. 
Hall is quoted as stating, 'The reaction has stunned me ... ," See id. The consen'ath'e cOllgres-
sional reaction was predictably negative with Speaker of the House Gingrich dismissing the 
measure as "emotional symbolism." See Shepard, supra note 9, at A6. 
13 See Shepard, supra note 9 ("Congressional leaders are cool to the notion that the federal 
government should formally apologize for slavery, perhaps because such an apology \\'Ould open 
the door to discussion of monetary reparations for descendants of slaves. "). '\1Ien President 
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American redress, opponents of the redress bill warned of the possi-
bility that its passage would set a precedent for reparations to other 
groups. J.I It is no wonder that other people of color, particularly Mrican 
Americans who support reparations to Japanese Americans, also feel 
vaguely unsettled about it. 
Moreover, the sentiment that there is something disquieting about 
Congress granting redress to Japanese Americans, but refusing even to 
consider the issue with respect to another deserving group, has not 
been lost on Asian-American legal scholars. In his incisive article, 
Friend, or Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress and Repara-
tions, Professor Eric Yamamoto articulated the dangers of Japanese-
American reparations in a larger context. 15 Since reparations do not 
change the "fundamental realities of power," Yamamoto argued, it may 
become a means by which "illusions of change" are fostered, 
thereby perpetuating the political structures that gave rise to the origi-
nal injuries. 16 Furthermore, he surmised that the support of repara-
tions by a Reagan-Bush Administration could have been explained by 
its desire to bolster its image among moderate voters. 17 Support of 
Clinton rejected the idea of a national apology for slavel"y, there was press speculation that his 
rejection was fueled by his concern about the reparations issue. See Associated Press, Clinton: No 
Apoiof!J'/or Siavl31)', THE SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 6, 1997, at A4 (reporting that aides privately stated 
that the \\11ite House was concerned about reparations); see also Zuckerman & McGrory, supra 
note 9 (reporting that Clinton "did not think the federal government should pay reparations to 
the descendants of slaves"). 
Significantly, the congressional supporters of redress assured Congress that the redress bill 
would "not open the door for claims by descendants offormer slaves or the descendants of Native 
American victims of the Federal Government's 19th century policies with respect to American 
Indians," since pa)1llents were not to be made to heirs or descendants of internees under the 
redress bill. See 134 CONGo REc. 54271 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988) (statement of Sen. Matsunaga). 
H Senator Wallop of Wyoming offered an amendment that no funds would be appropriated 
for japanese Ameticans until the Cherokee Nation was compensated for the Trail of Tears. 134 
CONGo REc. 54393 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1988). Senator Helms of NOlth Carolina offered an 
amendment to bar Mexicans', Native Americans' or others' territorial claims. See id. at 54394. 
Given the probability that any reparations bill for Native Americans-America's first internees-
would neither be forthcoming nor successful, this opposition to japanese-American redress on 
the basis of a preeminent Native American redress strikes a cynical chord. In fact, in a touch of 
even gl"eater cynicism, Senator Helms, a longtime opponent of civil rights legislation, voiced his 
opposition to japanese-American redress in part because of the possibility of its rationale being 
extended to African-American victims of jim Crow education policies. See id. at 54411; see also 
134 CONGo REc. 54335 (1988) (remarks of Sen. Chafee about the possible precedent in terms of 
reparations to Native Americans and African Americans); 134 CONGo REc. H6314 (1988) (state-
ment by Congressman Davis that it is unfair to first compensate japanese Americans when there 
were many other injustices done to other groups that should be compensated first). 
15 See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend, or Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress 
and &paratiolls, 20 DENY.]. INT'L L. & POL'y 223 (1992). 
16 See id. at 231-32, 240-41. 
17 See id. at 231. 
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reparations helped strengthen the appearance internationally that the 
United States, as a country, was committed to human rights. ls Finally, 
such support allowed the Republican Administration to point to a 
"model minority" group to defend its conservative racial policies. I'! 
Indeed, Yamamoto speculated that a pending class action lawsuit con-
cerning the internment, Hohri v. United States?) threatened the possi-
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 See Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984), ajJ'd in part rev'd in jmrt, 782 
F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated 482 U.S. 64 (1987), on remand, 847 F.2d 779 (Fed. Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988). 
Hohn ultimately turned on the issue of "'hether the six-year statute of limitations had run 
on the plaintiffs' constitutional takings claim. See 847 F.2d at 779. In Korematsu v. United States 
and Himbayashi v. United States, both challenges to the internment, the Supreme Court held that 
the internment was constitutional based upon the Government's allegations of military necessity. 
782 F.2d at 232-33. For a review of Korematsu and Himba)'aShi cases, see inji'{[ note 37. 
The Hohn plaintiffs, representing a class of former internees, argued that the Gm'ernment 
had purposely and fraudulently concealed e,·idence from the Supreme Court during the Kore-
matsu and Hirabayashi cases that indicated there was no military necessity for the internment, 
and that the six-year statute had therefore been tolled. See id. The district court, while not 
contradicting the assertion that the Gm'ernment had fraudulently concealed information from 
the Supreme Court, nevertheless concluded that the concealed information had been available 
to the plaintiffs as early as the late 1940s and held that the takings claim ,,-as barred by the statute 
of limitations. See 586 F. Supp. at 790. That holding ,,-as adopted ,dthout comment by the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals. See 847 F.2d at 7i9. 
""'hat is striking about the district court's opinion (and the Federal Circuit's brief affirmance 
of it) was its lack of contextual basis. Since the finding of militarv necessity by the Supreme Court 
and its presumption of military deference was the basis of the original KorelllatSll and Himba)'ashi 
decisions, "nothing less than an authoritative statement by one of the political branches, purport-
ing to review the evidence when taken as a ,dlOle, could rebut the presumption [of military 
deference] articulated in Km·ematsu." 782 F.2d at 251. In this case, the "authoritative statement" 
was the REpORT OF THE COMMISSION ON \\'ARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERN~IENT OF CInLIANS, 
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED (1982); the report of the congressional commission, set up in 1980, 
to investigate the internment concluded that information had been withheld from the Supreme 
Court. See id. at 252. 
Indeed, even the district court lIpon dismissing the case, ,,-as forced to acknowledge that a 
challenge to a finding by the Supreme Coun was a "formidable obstacle," but noted that such a 
task had been accomplished pre,iollsly by "diligent admcates." 586 F. Supp. at 788. However, 
what was left lIndiscussed by either the district court or the Federal Circuit was the effect of the 
political and social climate in the late 1940s or e'en in the early 1950s in terms of the reality of 
expecting the Supreme Court to be recepti,-e to"'ard japanese Americans challenging Court 
findings made only a few years before. The political climate with respect to japanese Americans 
being seen as foreigners had probably changed little, given that Asian Americans are still seen as 
foreigners today. See, e.g., Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, BI?)'ond Black and "lhite: Racializing Asian 
Americans in a Society Obsessed with OJ., 6 HAST. WOMEN'S LJ. 165, 174-86 (1995) (describing 
the stereotypes of Asian Americans as foreigners and outsiders). 
Moreover, given what information was available in the 1940s-se,'eral internal government 
documents dismissing any japanese-American security threat-it seemed eminently reasonable to 
expect that the japanese-American community would assume that a challenge to the military 
deference rationale would be unsuccessful. See Holl1'i, 847 F.2d at 783 (Bald"in, j., dissenting) 
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bility of a multi-million dollar recovery and exerted even more pres-
sure on Congress concerning the grant of reparations.21 
The suspicion that the Hohri class action lawsuit was a motivating 
factor is not without support in the record. There is ample evidence 
that Hohriwas very much on the minds of Congress during their debate 
over the bill.~2 
Moreover, Yamamoto postulated that the "model minority" stereo-
type conveyed a number of silent messages which in turn conveyed the 
("According to the trial court, the only obstacle in their way was a pair of Supreme Court decisions 
upholding [the Government's] actions and granting complete deference to the military's judg-
ment. ... At that time, however, with information available, they were destined for dismissal on 
the pleadings.") Indeed, two of the major cases cited by the district court of successful challenges 
to Supreme Court findings (Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) challenging Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) 
challenging Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842» had intervals of decades between them, 
thus allowing the passage of time to temper the assumptions inherent in the earlier opinions. 
Finally, there are compelling reasons to suggest that, in the first instance, the standard of 
review to decide the issues such as the incarceration of Japanese Americans should not be whether 
the presumption of military necessity can be O\'ercome. Professor Yamamoto has urged that in 
cases where the GO\'ernment imposes restrictions on civil liberties, except in circumstances of 
martial law, justifications of "national security" or "military necessity" should not replace the 
existing constitutional standard of review focusing on the right restricted. Eric K. Yamamoto, 
Korelllatslt Rellisited-Correcting the Injustice oj Extraordin(llY Government Excess and Lax Judicial 
Review: Time jor a Better Accommodation oj National Sewrity Concerns and Civil Liber·ties, 26 SANTA 
CLARA L. REv. 1,41-42 (1986). Indeed, the traditional standard ofrequiring a compelling state 
interest in cases of racial classification should encompass the question of whether there is a 
national security interest at stake. See id. at 42. 
21 See\\unamoto, supra note 15, at 225 n.8; see also, LESLIE T. HATAMIYA, RiGHTING A WRONG, 
JAPANESE Al\IERICANS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT OF 1988 177-78 (1993) 
(noting that the class action suit may ha\'e made H.R. 442 "appear to be a relatively inexpensive 
form of redress ... [and] may have given representati\'es and senators an incentive to vote for 
H.R. 442"). For a full description of the motivation, organization, and effect of the class action 
lawsuit see \\'ILLIAM H. HOHRI, REPAIRING fu\IERICA, AN ACCOUNT OF THE MOVEMENT FOR 
].-\PANESE-AMERICAN REDRESS (1988). 
22 See 134 CONGo REc. 54329 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1988) (reference made by Sen. Stevens to 
"hundreds of billions of dollars" if a court awarded damages in terms of compensatory and 
punitive damages). See id. at 54399 (reference by Sen. Domenici to the ruling in district court 
that the Hohri class action had cause of action for losses). See id. at 54403-04 (reprinted statement 
of Richard K. \Yillard, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, United States Department of 
Justice, re\iewing related litigation including the Holui class action). See id. at 54408 (reference 
by Sen. Helms to the Hohli litigation as making legislation inappropriate). See also 133 CONGo 
REc. H7560 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (statement by Congressman Frank that the bill would be 
in effect a settlement of the Hoh!? class action lawsuit). See id. at H7571 (reference by Congress-
man Le\'ine to Holl1i lawsuit). See id. at H7586 (reference by Congressman Vento that the bill 
would "avoid court ordered reparations" if the Hohli class action were carried through to 
fruition). See 134 CONGo REc. H6312 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1988) (reading of a letter by President 
Reagan into record by Congressman Frank supporting the bill and specifically citing the bill's 
assurance that "acceptance of compensation under the legislation fully satisfies claims against the 
United States based on the unique circumstances of the internment."). 
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notion that if other minorities were the same as Japanese Americans 
and had overcome hardship without Government aid, they would be 
"rewarded" as wel1. 23 Indeed, these fears are also well-founded. Con-
temporaneous stories in the national and local popular press about 
how Asian Americans were a "model minority" were pre\'alent during 
the time of debate and passage of the redress bill.24 It is no accident 
that there is ample evidence in the record of allusions to the "model 
minority" image of Asian Americans, and particularly of Japanese 
Americans. 25 
Thus, Yamamoto, among others, has concluded that Japanese 
Americans had a responsibility to scrutinize their "model minority" 
status, challenge governmental excesses of power domestically and 
internationally, and address issues affecting people of color.21i Monetary 
reparation for Japanese Americans comes with a responsibility-a re-
2~ See Yamamoto, supra note IS, at 238. Yamamoto points out that the model minority 
stereotype: 
1. minimizes the deep-seated harm inflicted upon Japanese Americans by the gO\'ernment's 
misllse of power; 
2. masks the problems of poor Asian communities and continuing discrimination against 
Asians; 
3. excuses the government from acting affirmatively to eradicate discrimination and subor-
dination by emphasizing self-sufficiency; 
4. falsely privileges Asian Americans at the expense of others, driving a wedge between them 
and other groups of color. !d. 
24 See, e.g., Martin Kasindorf et aI., Asian Americans: A "Model 1\[inOlit)', "NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 
1982, at 39; Daniel A. Bell, The Triumph of Asian-American; Amelica 's G,mtest Success StOl)" THE 
NEW REpUBLIC, July IS, 1985, at 24; Be\'erly McLoed, The Oliental ExjJress; Asian Amelican 
Immigrants are Seen as a "Model" MinOlit)' on a Fast Track to Success, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, July, 
1986, at 48; David Brand, The Nelli Whiz Kids: H71)' Asian Amelicans are Doing So nell, and TYhat 
It Costs Them, TIME, Aug. 31,1987, at 42; Opinion/Editorial, The Asian Famil)': Garden of Values, 
THE SAN-DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 4, 1986, at B6;Jim Spencer, H71)' Fu Lien Can Read: For Asian 
Ammcans, Learning is a Family Obligation, CHI. TRIB., Jan. IS, 1986, at Cl. 
25 See 134 CONGo REc. S4328 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1988) (reference by Sen. Hecht that many 
Japanese Americans were "multimillionaires today"); !d. at S4413 (reference by Sen. Helms to 
the fact that "wealthy Asian Americans" were opposing Representative Dan Lundgren's re-election 
because Lundgren opposed individual reparations). 133 CONGo REc. H7564 (dailyed. Sept. 17, 
1987) (reference by Congressman ShunH\'ay-opposing bill-to Japanese Americans as "some of 
the most respectable, hard-working, loyal Americans that we have in this country"); !d. at H7569 
(reference by Congressman Levine to Japanese Americans' "great contributions to our country" 
in "business, architecture, science, medicine, education" and stating that "[s]ome of our greatest 
scientists, educators and business leaders are Japanese-Americans"); /d. at H7581 (reference by 
Congressman Packard to the fact that "[o]ur Japanese friends don't need [the reparations 
money]) "; ld. at H7594 (reference by Congressman Brown that some ofColorado's "finest citizens 
. . . some of Ollr most honest, hardworking, and productive human beings" came from the 
relocation camps to Colorado); 134 CONGo REc. H6314 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1988) (statement by 
Congressman Lehman stating that bill would se!'\'e to sholl' "the respect \\'e all have for the 
contributions that Japanese-Americans have made to our society.") 
2(; See Yamamoto, supra note 15, at 240. 
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fusal to be used to excuse or perpetuate the racism that caused the 
internment in the first instance.~7 
The actual content of that refusal, however, presents a more dif-
ficult and complex question. The refusal to be used to perpetuate 
subordination implies the existence of a shared political vision and a 
united political will. However difficult that consensus may be to a-
chieve, part of the process of acting upon that responsibility lies in 
repudiating the political and ideological values that were implicit dur-
ing congressional debate on the redress bill itself. Moreover, since 
influential economic forces benefitted from the relocation, Japanese 
Americans are compelled to be even more vigilant in scrutinizing and 
exposing connections to powerful economic interests when govern-
mental decisions are made that have a negative impact upon the poor 
and people of color.28 
There is a particular irony about the debate on the redress bill. 
While there was general agreement, at least rhetorically, on the injus-
tice of the internment, all of the glowing historical references centered 
around those contemporary political and ideological positions that 
justified and accommodated the decision to intern Japanese Americans. 29 
Those who, at the time of internment, saw it for the injustice and 
outrage that it was and chose to dissent continue to be silenced and un-
heralded even during the process of acknowledging their prescience. 
27 See id. (citing We Shall Not Be Used, ASIAN L. REp., July 1990 at 7, reprint of address by 
Mari Matsuda). 
2M Part of the cry for Japanese-American internment was raised by "influential agriculturalists 
who had long cast their cO\'etous eyes oyer the coastal webwork of rich Japanese-owned land, a 
superb opportunity had thus become theirs for the long-sought expulsion of an unwanted 
minority." MICHl WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA's CONCENTRATION 
CAMPS 36 (1976). Weglyn noted that although comprising only one percent of California's 
population, Japanese Americans controlled oyer 50 percent of the commercial truck crops before 
internment, such that the retail distribution of fruits and vegetables in Southern California "was 
already a firmly entrenched monopoly of Japanese Americans." See id. at 36-37. Weglyn explains: 
It was a common practice among the Issei to snatch up strips of marginal unwanted 
land which were cheap: swamplands, barren desert areas that Caucasians disdained 
to inyest their labor in .... The extraordinary drive and morale of these hard-work-
ing, frugal Issei who could turn parched wastelands, even marshes, into lush grow-
ing fields-usually with help from the entire family-became legendary. In the 
course of the years, notably during periods of economic crisis, a hue and cry arose 
of "unfair competition" and accusations that "the Japs have taken over the best 
land!" 
Id. at 37; see also ROGER DANIELS, PRISONERS WITHOUT TRIAL, JAPANESE AMERICANS IN VI'oRLD 
WAR II 13-14 (1993) (discussing the economic success and influence of the Japanese-American 
population in California anel Washington before their internment and the subsequent backlash). 
29 It is somewhat analogous to condemning the Nazi invasion of France and celebrating the 
Vichy Goyernment. 
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In essence, what Americans were being told by Congress to celebrate, 
by the giving of redress to Japanese Americans, was that patriotism-
the kind of patriotism that does not resist injustice-gets rewarded. 'J(J 
Thus, the ideological baggage of the decision to redress the injustice 
of internment is the celebration of the "superpatriotic" response to it. 
It is this response-the ideological component of the model minority 
stereotype-and its celebration by Congress that contain great lessons 
and holds great dangers for Japanese Americans in particular and 
Asian Americans in general.:Jl 
Part I will review the ideological themes that were put forward by 
congressional supporters of the redress bill. These themes echoed 
specific political positions taken during the time of internment within 
the Japanese-American community that urged acquiescence to the 
relocation and counseled unquestioning obedience to all governmen-
tal action no matter how unjustified. Part II postulates how an uncriti-
cal adoption of the congressional attitude toward Japanese Americans 
and the normative values inherent in congressional approval of the 
redress bill implicate present day issues with respect to America's racial 
hierarchy and Asian Americans' place within it. 
Finally, it should be emphasized at the outset that I have no 
criticism of the way organizations, individuals, and their families re-
sponded to relocation. My intent here is not to second-guess, with the 
benefit of perfect hindsight, the particular decisions that individuals 
and families made in response to relocation. I recognize how difficult 
it is for someone who did not experience it to understand the tenor 
30 This is not to ignore the various reasons why Senators opposed gi\'ing any redress for the 
violation of Japanese Americans' rights. Indeed, the \'ery same racism equatingJapanese nationals 
with Japanese Americans that caused the hysteria that lead to the camps forty-fi\'e years earlier 
was still evident on the floor of both the Senate and the House in 1988. 
Senator Helms proposed that no redress should be forthcoming to Japanese Americans un til 
"the Government of Japan has fairly compensated the families of the men and \\'Omen who were 
killed as a result of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941." 134 CONGo 
REe. 54398 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1988). This racist equation was echoed in the House by Congress-
woman Bentley who stated that she was opposed to the legislation because American prisoners 
of war "who were treated cruelly and frequently tortured, sometimes tortured to death" were 
more deserving. 134 CONGo REe. H6309 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1988). 
31 To put a celebration of a "supelcpatriotic" response to racial injustice in a contemporary 
context, it is instructive to note that "'a I'd Connerly-the African-American millionaire who, as 
a Regent of California University and later as a leader for the effort to pass the eventually 
successful Proposition 209 California ballot measure \\'hich banned affirmative action in hiring, 
contracting and college admissions-has been described as "extra\'agantly patriotic." See BaITY 
Bearak, Questions of Race Run Deep for Foe of Preferences, N.V. TI~[ES, July 27, 1997, at AI. It is 
reported that Connedy claims to recite the Pledge of Allegiance and the opening lines of the 
Declaration of Independence six to ten times a day. See id. at 20. 
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of the racial hysteria after Pearl Harbor and the dangers faced by the 
Japanese-American community. Nor do I seek to dispute assertions that 
the response of many in the Japanese-American community during 
times of war to prove their loyalty may have been the key to allowing 
congressional acceptance of redress. Rather, my purpose in reviewing 
the implications of the various positions taken by members of the 
Japanese-American community at the time of relocation is to seek out 
the lessons that hindsight might give to help ensure that internment, 
or its equivalent, will not happen again to Japanese Americans or 
anyone else.3~ Thus, there should be no mistake that the major thrust 
of my concern and criticism lies not with the response of any victim of 
this injustice, but with the lessons that Congress wants us to draw from 
it. 
1. IDEOLOGICAL THEMES AND POLITICAL POSITIONS 
A. The Tenor of the Congressional Debate 
Throughout congressional debate about the internment camps 
two consistent themes emerged-the injustice of the internment itself 
and the patriotic response of the Japanese-American community 
throughout the internment ordeal exemplified by their acquiescence 
and unqualified support of it. Indeed, the halls of Congress rang with 
fervent denunciations of the camps, the atmosphere of racial paranoia, 
and the scapegoating of Japanese Americans as profoundly un-Ameri-
can. Typical of the remarks in favor of the redress legislation were those 
of Congressman Rodino: 
The preamble of the Constitution speaks eloquently about 
the blessings of liberty, the most basic and fundamental of 
our civil rights. All American citizens enjoy these rights and 
they expect to be protected from arbitrary imprisonment by 
the Federal Government. Some 40 years ago during World 
War II, the Federal Government without providing any due 
process under law, sent nearly 120,000 loyal American citizens 
and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry to remote intern-
ment camps. Many of these individuals, in the panic of sud-
den departures, lost their businesses, farms, and homes. Most 
of all they were deprived of their personal freedom. This great 
3~ The Act expressly states that one of its purposes is to "prevent" and "discourage the 
occurrence of similar injustices and violations of civil liberties in the future." 50 U.S.c. app. 
§ 1989(3) & (6) (1990). 
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wrong to this day remains uncorrected. A truly great nation 
is worthy of its greatness when it recognizes that it has made 
mistakes. We now have the opportunity to recognize and to 
redress this grave injustice by the passage of [the redress 
billJ.33 
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Yet, despite this acknowledged injustice of the internment, there 
was much focus and laudatory praise of the acquiescent response to it. 
The sentiments of Congressman Yates were typical: 
When the attack on Pearl Harbor came immediately the peo-
ple of Japanese ancestry became targets for suspicion 
throughout the United States and Hawaii without cause or 
provocation. Japanese who had been living in California for 
many years were uprooted, homes destroyed, and they them-
selves placed behind barbed wire detention fences \vithout a 
hearing or trial. ... [T] his should have been enough to kill 
the spirit of a less responsible group of people. But the reply 
from the Japanese parents was to sent [sic] their children out 
from behind the wire fences into the American Armed Forces 
to fight the Nazis and the armed forces of their ancient 
homeland.34 
The reference to the heroism and success of the segregatedJapa-
nese-American Army unit, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, is also 
typical.35 The accolades were much deserved, and celebrated achieve-
ments about which all Americans, particularly Japanese Americans, are 
33133 CONGo REc. H7559 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (remarks of Congressman Rodino). 
34 133 CONGo REc. H7582 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987). 
35 Indeed, the House number of the bill was H.R. 442. The accomplishments of the 442nd 
Regimental Combat Team are without peer: The 442nd, and its predecessor unit the 100th 
Infantry Battalion from Hawai'i, won seven Presidential Unit Citations, one Congressional Medal 
of Honor, 52 Distinguished Service Crosses, 588 Sil,er Stars, 9486 Purple Hearts, fought in seven 
major campaigns, and suffered 680 fatalities. See 134 CO:\,G. REc. S4277 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988) 
(remarks of Sen. Adams); see also DANIELS, supra note 28, at 64 (noting that the 442nd \I'as the 
"most decorated unit in the entire American Army" and included a winner of the Congressional 
Medal of Honor). Daniels observed that, "[i]n what may have been the supreme irony of their 
service, the men of the 442nd helped to liberate the Nazi concentration camp at Dachau even 
while their parents and other relatives were still held in American concentration camps." DANIELS, 
supra note 28, 64; see 134 CONGo REc. S4271 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988) (statement of Sen. 
Matsunaga about the 442nd); id. at S4323 (statement of Sen. Inouye; id. at S4324, S4330 
(statement of Sen. Matsunaga); 133 CONGo REc. H7556 (dailv ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (statement of 
Congressman Bonior); id. at H7582 (statement of Congressman Yates that no 442nd member 
deserted); 134 CONGo REc. at H6310 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1988) (statement of Congressman Blaz); 
id. at H6312 (statement of Congressman Fazio); id. at H6313 (statement of Congressman l\fineta); 
id. at H6314 (statement of Congressman Lehman). 
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proud.36 Yet, the congressional debate was barren of favorable, indeed 
any, references to those heroic "others"-Japanese-American draft re-
sisters who refused to fight for the United States until their families 
were freed from the campsP 
An example of this resistance was the Fair Play Committee at Heart 
Mountain Relocation Center, which was organized to protest the vio-
lation of constitutional rights. ~lH In March 1944, the committee publish-
'luSee 133 CONGo REc. H7580 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (statement of Congressman Hoyer 
noting that the 4500 men in the 442nd receh'ed 5300 Bronze Stars and 18,000 individual 
decorations from 18 allied nations including the French Croix de Guerre and the Italian Croce 
al Merito di Guerra). 
~li See HOHRI, supra note 21, at 172-75 (quoting hearing testimony of Jack Tono before the 
Commission on \\'artime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (C\VRlC) in New York on 
November 23, 1984). Tono testified that he, with a group of 62 other men, protested the military 
senice of Japanese Americans while their families were in camp "to right the wrong which has 
been done to us Japanese Americans." [d. at 174. 
In all, 315 internees were arrested for violations of Selective Service Laws. See id. at 6. They 
came from the camps at Topaz, Poston, Granada, Heart Mountain, Jerome, Minidoka, Rohwer, 
and Tule Lake. See id. at 14. Of the 315, 263 were convicted. See id. At Poston Relocation Center, 
approximately 200 young men were eventually indicted and tried for violations of the Selective 
Service Act for their refusal to be drafted to take up arms for freedom which neither they nor 
their parents enjoyed. See WEGLYN, supra note 28, at 126-27, 303 n.37. 
During the congressional debate on the bill, Congressman Pelosi did acknowledge the efforts 
to overturn the wartime convictions of Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Minoru Yasui. 
134 CONGo REc. H6314 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1988). Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and 
Minorn Yasui all individually challenged the evacuation of Japanese Americans from designated 
military zones, based upon Executive Order 9066, signed by President Roosevelt on February 19, 
1942. All were arrested aud convicted of curfew and evacuation violations. Their cases went to 
the Supreme Court and all were denied justice in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); 
lasui V. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
The other wartime legal challenge to relocation was Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), which 
gran ted her m'it of habeas co/pus releasing her from detainment and held that the War Relocation 
Authority (WRA) could not detain loyal citizens. However, the War Department was secretly 
notified of the Supreme Court's Endo decision 10 days before it was announced, and it rescinded 
the exclusion and detention orders one day before the decision was handed down. See HATAMIYA, 
supra note 21, at 24. 
l\[uch has been written about the struggle of Korematsu, Yasui, and Hirabayashi to have their 
convictions rev'ersed on writs of coram nobis, Hiraba)'llshi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 
1987), Korematsll1i. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D.Cal. 1984); Yasui died before his petitiou 
could be finally adjudicated, see IRONS, infra at 29-30, as well as the critical roles played by activists, 
lawyers, and scholars. See, e.g., PETER IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE 
AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1989). It goes without saying that both their courageous resis-
tance to the internment as well as their fight to seek judicial redress of their convictions were 
major inspirations for the redress movement. See HATAMIYA, supra note 21, at 171-72. Hatamiya 
obsen'ed that the successful contm nobis petitions, which had shown the deliberate suppression 
of evidence by the Government in 1943-44 proving that no threat of Japanese-American espio-
nage or sabotage existed, had a major educational and public relations impact. See id. at 170-72. 
It "wiped away any legal basis for a nay vote on the redress legislation on the grounds that there 
had been at least some military necessity for the orders." [d. at 172. 
38 See HOHRI, supra note 21, at 13. 
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ed a leaflet protesting the injustice of orderihgJapanese Americans to 
join a segregated unit in the Army without restoration of their consti-
tutional rights. 39 The Committee declared: 
We are not being disloyal. We are not evading the draft. We 
are all loyal Americans fighting for JUSTICE AND DEMOC-
RACY RIGHT HERE AT HOME.40 
The seven leaders of the Heart Mountain draft resistance move-
ment, Kiyoshi Okamoto, Paul Nakadate, Ben Wakaye, Ken Yanagi, 
Frank Emi, Minoru Tamesa, and Sam Horino were convicted later 
that year on draft conspiracy charges. 41 Yet these men and others, 
who also sacrificed for hallowed democratic principles, went unno-
ticed during the congressional debate. 
The congressional decision to celebrate the "blind obedience" 
response to injustice, rather than resistance to it, would be merely 
short-sighted if done in isolation. However, this perspective is consis-
tent throughout the congressional debate and sends a clear message 
about what lessons Congress and President Reagan, who later signed 
the bill, hoped the law would teach Japanese Americans and people of 
color in general. 
Reference to the redress bill, both before and after its passage, is 
striking in one unique aspect. There is an express and consistent 
connection made between the bill and the political perspective of Mike 
Masaoka, the Executive Secretary and spokesperson of the Japanese 
American Citizens League (JACL) at the time of the internment. 42 This 
is significant because at the time of the internment, the position of the 
391d. at 33. 
40 ld. (emphasis in original). 
41 See id. at 13; see also DANIELS, sujJm note 28, at 64 (noting that 85 inmates of Heart 
Mountain relocation camp refused military induction on the basis that as long as there was 
internment, there was no obligation to serve in the military). Daniels notes that of the 385 men 
from Heart Mountain who entered the army, 11 \I'ere killed and 52 were \\'Ollllded. See id. There 
were 3600 men who entered the arm)' directly from the camps, of which at least 172 were killed 
in action, 590 were wounded and 15 declared missing. See id. 
In 1990, the jACL adopted a resolution recognizing that: 
[Tlhose japanese American draft resisters who declared their loyalty to their coun-
try but were also dedicated to the principle of defending their chil rights, were 
willing to make significant sacrifices to uphold their beliefs ... in a different form 
from those who sacrificed their lil'es on the battlefields; and that they too deserl'e 
a place of honor and respect in the history of Americans of japanese ancestry. 
Hokubei Mainichi, jACL Resolution Recognizes Draft Resisters, THE CHICAGO SHIMPO, Aug. 15, 
1990, at 1; see a/so ASIANWEEK,june 29,1990, at 12. 
42 See, e.g" 134 CONGo REc. H6308-09 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1988). In fact, Congressman Matsui 
inserted Masaoka's 'Japanese American Creed," written in 1941, into the record: 
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JACL, and Masaoka in particular, was one of complete and uncritical 
support for it. It was the JACL that urged unquestioning compliance 
with internment and actively cooperated with the Government in sup-
pressing any dissent within the Japanese-American community.43 
Typical of the sentiments expressed about Masaoka and the activ-
ity of the wartime JACL are Congressman Edwards' remarks on the 
. I am proud that I am an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, for my very 
background makes me appreciate more fully the wonderful advantages of this 
Nation. I believe in her institutions, ideals and traditions; I glory in her heritage; I 
boast of her history; I trust in her future. She has granted me liberties and oppor-
tunities such as no indi\'idual el~oys in this world today. She has given me an 
education befitting kings. She has entrusted me with the responsibility offranchise. 
She has permitted me to build a home, earn a livelihood, to worship, think, speak, 
and act as I please-as a free man equal to every other man. 
Although some individuals may discriminate against me I shall never become 
bitter or lose faith, for I know such persons are not representative of the majority 
of the American people. True, I shall do all in my power to discourage such 
practices, but I shall do it in the American way: above board, in the open, through 
courts of law, by education, by proving myself to be worthy of equal treatment and 
consideration. I am firm in my belief that American sportsmanship and attitude of 
fair pay [sic] will judge citizenship and patriotism on the basis of action and 
achievement, and not on the basis of physical characteristics. 
Because I believe in America, and I trust she believes in me, and because I have 
received innumerable benefits from her I pledge myself to do honor to her at all 
times and in all places, to support her Constitution, to obey her laws, to respect her 
Flag, to defend her against all enemies, foreign or domestic, to actively assume my 
duties and obligations as a citizen, cheerfully and without any reservations whatso-
ever, on the hope that I may become a better American in a greater America. 
See iel. Within two years of the artiClllation of the creed, Japanese Americans were behind barbed 
wire. See DANIELS, supra note 28, at 21. 
Masaoka was also eulogized on the floor of Congress after his death in 1991. See 137 CONGo 
REc. E2854-02 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991) (statement by Congressman Dixon). See 137 CONGo REc. 
H5890-901, H5885-86 (daily ed.July 25,1991) (statement by Congressman Minetta); iel. at H5891 
(statement bv Congressman Abercrombie); iel. at H5891-902 (statement by Congressman Frank); 
iel. at H5892-906 (statement by Congressman Yates); iel. at H5896 (statement by Congressman 
Levine). See also 137 CONGo REc. H5896-97 (daily ed.July 25, 1991) (statement by Congressman 
Berman); iel. at H5897 (statement by Congressman Lehman); iel. (statement by Congresswoman 
Boxer); iel. (statement by Congressman Lantos); iel. at E2726--27 (statement by Congressman 
Man-oules); iel. at H5886-87 (statement by Congressman Edwards); iel. at H5887-88 (statement 
by Congressman Matsui); 137 CONGo REG. S9099 (daily ed. June 28, 1991) (statement by Sen. 
Inouye). In each of these eulogies, allusions were made to Masaoka's leadership in the passing 
of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. For a discussion of the positions taken by wartime JACL leaders 
such as l\Iasaoka, on the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, see infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
It should be noted that this tribute came after the original funding was appropriated on 
November 21, 1989 when President Bush signed H.R.2991 establishing redress as an entitlement 
program. However, it was not until March 1992 that amendments were introduced in the House 
and Senate to extend redress benefits to an additional 20,000 eligible recipients who would not 
have received payment under the original entitlement program. See HATAMIYA, supra note 21, at 
188 . 
• 3 See infra notes 68-85 and accompanying text. 
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floor of Congress on December 21, 1987.44 Edwards' ostensible purpose 
was to put into the record the news of the recent publication of 
Masaoka's autobiography, "They Call Me Moses Masaoka. "45 In the 
beginning of his remarks, Edwards alluded to the fact that the House 
of Representatives had recently approved the Civil Liberties Act and 
that it was only awaiting approval by the Senate.46 He then went on to 
recognize Masaoka's participation in the redress issue itselfY Quite 
remarkably, he then devoted a substantial portion of his remarks to a 
ringing endorsement of the political positions of Masaoka and the 
JACL during the period of internment: 
Masaoka explains in considerable detail the reasons for 
JACL's controversial cooperation in the initial evacuation or-
ders, noting that even with the benefit of almost half a cen-
tury of hindsight, he does not know of any knowledgeable 
individual, evacuee or others, who has advanced a viable, 
practical, and effective alternath'e to their reluctant and dif-
ficult but patriotic decision. A" a former FBI agent who also 
was very much aware of the true mood and atmosphere of 
the situation on the Pacific Coast, however, I can vouch for 
the fact that there appeared to be no other pragmatic or 
realistic choice but to comply with the military, which those 
of Japanese ethnicity did without violence or terrorism. 48 
What is noticeably absent in Edwards' defense of Masaoka's histori-
cal role is any reference to the reasons why JACL's cooperation was 
44 See 133 CONGo REC. H1l938-12003 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987). 
45Id. 
40 See id. 
47Id. 
4R Id. It should be noted that m)' purpose in looking at l\[asaoka's political positions, and its 
reflection in the JACL's acth'ities during the internment, is not specificallv to ignore either 
Masaoka's or the JACL's achievements. Indeed, many credit Masaoka and the JACL "'ith being a 
significant force in the final granting of citizenship rights for the Issei in 1952. See WEGLYN, supra 
note 28, at 268 (calling the achievement of citizenship rights a '\eritable tour de force for the 
Japanese American Citizens League ... achie\'ed largely th\'Qugh the intensive lobbying efforts 
of its ''''ashington representative, Mike Masaoka"). Moreover, this piece is also not primarily meant 
to criticize the internment position taken by the JACL and its supporters, although there are 
many t\'Qubling questions about the JACL's "'artime activities. That piece of history is m'er. 
Instead, this article highlights the political lessons that may be draml from the experience 
in order to avoid the same kind of tragedy happening again, not only to Japanese Americans but 
to any other people. Moreover, it recognizes that while presently there are no official "internment 
camps," there are conditions for many people of color, whether it be in urban ghettos, on 
"resen'ations," or in penal institutions, that are the result of social, political, and economic 
barriers that may be even more difficult to surmount than the barbed wire ones which held 111)' 
parents and relatives captive. 
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"controversial" in the first instance. Indeed, it only hints at other 
contemporaneous perspectives that existed within the Japanese-
American community at the time. 
B. Resistance to Incarceration 
The relocation of the en tire Japanese-American population of the 
West Coast did not proceed without meeting resistance. In fact, "over 
100 Japanese-Americans deliberately violated at least one of the or-
ders. "~9 In addition to resistance to the draft, there were periodic strikes 
and even riots within the internment camps; the Army's suppression 
of these actions resulted in numerous casualties and fatalities. 50 Numer-
ous acts of overt mass resistance within the internment camps have 
been documented: 
(1) a farm strike at Tule Lake Relocation Center on August 15, 
1942, over inadequate food rations, work speed-up, wages and work 
clothing allotment;51 
(2) a construction strike at Tule Lake Relocation Center on Sep-
tember 3, 1942, over layoffs without pay, reduction in the Japanese-
American crew in favor of white crew members, and lack of clothing;52 
(3) a petition campaign resulting in 9,000 signatures and a mess 
hall "slowdown" at Tule Lake Relocation Center on October 12, 1942, 
over food distribution and mess hall conditions;53 
(4) a general strike at Poston Relocation Center on November 15, 
1942, over the arrest of two camp residents suspected in the beating 
of FBI informers;54 
(5) a riot at Manzanar Relocation Center on December 5, 1942, 
over arrests resulting from the beating of a suspected "inu" during 
which machine guns were fired and gas bombs were thrown at camp 
residents by soldiers, resulting in ten wounded and two killed;55 
49 See HATAMIYA, supra note 21, at 23. 
50 William Hohri articulates three attempts at redress during the camps: (1) the attempt by 
James Omura in Colorado to organize legal action against the United States to restore civil and 
citizenship rights for Japanese Americans in 1942; (2) a letter written from inside the camps by 
Joseph Y. Kurihara in 1943 in which he proposes $5000 for "each and every evacuee"; and (3) 
Kiyoshi Okamoto and James Omura leading the draft resistance at Heart Mountain Relocation 
Camp, and later in 1946 Okamoto establishing 'The Fair Rights Committee" to seek restitution 
for the internees. See HOHRl, supra note 21, at 28-34. 
51 See DOROTHY S. THOMAS & RICHARD S. NISHIMOTO, THE SPOILAGE: JAPANESE-AMERICAN 
EVACUATION AND RESETTLEMENT DURING WORLD WAR II 41-42 (1969). 
52 See id. at 43. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. at 45-49. JACL members were often suspected by camp residents of being informers 
or "inus," the literal Japanese translation of which is "dog." See id. at 45-52. 
05 See id. at 49-51; see also WEGLYN, supra note 28, at 121-25. 
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(6) a strike by a coal crew at Tule Lake Relocation Center on 
October 7, 1943, over working conditions;56 
(7) a strike by farm workers at Tule Lake Relocation Center on 
October 15, 1943, over dangerous working conditions which resulted 
in an accident injuring twenty-nine workers and killing one;57 
(8) a hunger strike by 200 detainees at Tule Lake Relocation 
Center on December 31, 1943, over their arrest as a result of the 
imposition of martial law at Tule Lake;58 
(9) a mass demonstration at Tule Lake Relocation Center on 
November 1, 1943, over general conditions including racism of Cau-
casian personnel toward camp residents.59 
Indeed, the attitude among many camp inmates was one of dis-
quiet and resistance over many issues; disagreement over the extent to 
which the community should cooperate with the Government was both 
widespread and contentious. This cleavage over the reaction to the 
internment might be best illustrated by the reaction to the administra-
tion of the "Loyalty Oath" to in ternees who were seven teen years old or 
0lder.60 Even putting aside the outrageous insensitivity of the oath-tak-
ing requirement, responding to the Loyalty Oath questions created 
unfathomable community pressures for the incarcerated Japanese 
American population.6! 
The Loyalty Oath questions permitted only ''yes'' or "no" answers. 
However, irrespective of their political views, the fact remained that 
"yes" answers to the loyalty questions for the Issei, who were not citizens 
of the United States, left them with the possibility of becoming people 
with no country.62 Some felt that a "yes" answer could have been a trap 
56 See THOMAS & NISHIMOTO, supra note 51, at 113. 
57 See id. at 114-15. 
58 See id. at 174. 
59 See WEGLYN, supra note 28, at 162. 
60 See id. at 136-40. In actuality, the "Loyalty Oath" consisted of two identical questions in 
two different forms-one for draft age Nisei, the "Statement of United States Citizenship of 
Japanese Ancestry," and the other for Issei and female Nisei, "Application for Leave Clearance." 
They were as follows: 
See id. 
No. 27. Are you willing to senoe in the armed forces of the United States on 
combat duty, wherever ordered? 
No. 28. Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and 
faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign and domestic 
forces, and foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, 
to any other foreign government, power or organization? 
61 Incredibly, this oath was administered to a population that had just been uprooted, 
terrorized, and unjustly incarcerated by their Government. The action by the WRA has been 
characterized as one of "incredible stupidity" and "colossal folly." DANIELS, supra note 28, at 68; 
WEGLYN, supra note 28, at 135. 
62 SeeWEGLYN, supra note 28, at 136-37. 
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to identify Japan sympathizers since it could be interpreted as an 
admission of prior allegiance to Japan.63 A "no" answer to question 27 
with respect to armed forces service could reflect less on disloyalty than 
a repugnance for incarceration. l)4 Indeed, complying with the evacu-
ation itself could be seen as the ultimate test of loyalty.65 Many won-
dered whether the "yes-yes" responders were going to be "rewarded" 
by being drafted, while the "no-no" responders were to be "rewarded" 
with continued incarceration or worse.66 Indeed, some Issei feared that 
a "yes" response would get them thrown out of camp without re-
sources.lj7 
In any event, almost 9,000 residents answered question 28 "no," 
and were classified as "disloyal" although the precise reasons for that 
answer probably could not be neatly assumed or categorized.68 Those 
deemed "disloyal" were transferred to Tule Lake Relocation Center, 
while those deemed "loyal" at Tule Lake were transferred to other 
camps.6~ The aftermath of this cleavage was devastating: 
On the surface, this innocuous questionnaire resulted in the 
transfer of 18,711 evacuees between centers for the purpose 
of segregation and in 4,224 cases, eventual repatriation .... 
In actuality, the "Loyalty Oath" served to segregate generation 
against generation, religion against religion, family against 
family, and wreaked havoc on households and individuals-a 
veritable civil war with no winners. 7o 
Thus, the tributes in connection to the political positions and 
choices of Masaoka and the JACL are more than just recognition of an 
individual's or an organization's contributions to his country. Given 
the history of contemporaneous and relatively substantial resistance to 
internment-a governmental action which even the Government now 
concedes was without justification-the extraordinary recognition and 
official Government imprimatur of what some would consider the 
extreme positions taken by the JACL and its spokesperson Masaoka 
require greater scrutiny.71 
63 See id. at 137-38. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 See DANIELS, supra note 28, at 69. 
6Il See id. 
69 See id. at 70. 
70 HOHRI, supra note 21, at 136 (quoting the testimony of Lawson Inada, professor of English 
at Southern Oregon College and well regarded poet before the Commission on Wartime Relo-
cation and Internment of Civilians). 
il It should be noted at the outset that the members of the jACL such as Edison Uno, 
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C. The Wartime Japanese American Citizen '5 League Under Masaoka 
The wartime JACL was a group of young Nisei struggling to culti-
vate a leadership role in the Japanese-American community.72 Before 
the evacuation, it was the Issei who provided the Japanese-American 
community's leadership and stability.73 The JACL's overall political 
agenda was one of "super-patriotism" in the face of racial and eco-
nomic persecution.74 Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the JACL moved to-
ward "formal collaboration" with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
to "inform on all individuals who appeared to be a danger. "75 In prac-
tically every instance the JACL stood in vocal and active opposition to 
Japanese-American resistance to internment, and enthusiastically en-
dorsed and supported the actions of the Government with respect to 
internment and suppression of dissent: 
(1) members of the JACL leadership were involved in identifYing 
noncitizen Issei and Kibei community leaders to the FBI and Office of 
Naval Intelligence before Pearl Harbor;71; 
(2) members acted as Government informants to identify those 
they "suspected of disloyalty" before the evacuation; 77 
Raymond Okamura, and William Hohri have consistently played an active role in pushing the 
organization to take stands on issues of equity and racial justice since the 1960s. Indeed, it was 
Edison Uno and other jACL members who first proposed the idea of redress. See HOHRI, supra 
note 21, at 37-38. 
72 See WEGLYN, supra note 28, at 44-45. There is some evidence that although the jACL 
leadership had claimed to "speak for" the japanese-American community during the internment, 
its actual membership barely reached 2000. This information is contained on page 65, § lIB of 
a report compiled in 1989 by Deborah Lim, an attorney and Asian Studies instructor at San 
Francisco State University who was hired by the JACL to research the wartime acth'ity of the 
organization. See DEBORAH K. LIM, THE LIM REpORT 65 (1990); see also Muto, Controllers)' Oller 
Report onJACL Wartime Role, ASIANWEEK, Noy. 23, 1990, at 1. Her mandate was the result of a 
resolution passed at the JACL's 1988 national com'ention to haye the organization apologize for 
some of its actions during World War II. See Muto, supra. In 1990, Lim completed her research 
and delivered a report ("The Lim Report") which was highly critical of the organization's 
activities, but the JACL released only a summary of her report after deleting most of the critical 
content at its convention in 1990. See Clifford Uyeda,jACLs Report on Dissidents, PAC. CITIZEN, 
Aug. 31, 1990, at 5. In 1994, the organization agreed to release the original report. Takeshi 
Nakayama, Lim Report to be Released at National Convention, RAFU SHiMPO, May 24, 1994. More-
over, I have looked at much of the original source material on which the "Lim Report" based its 
conclusions. 
73 See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 77 (1983). 
74 See id.; see also WEGLYN, supra note 28, at 44-45. 
75 See IRONS, supra note 73, at 79. The Anti-Axis Committee was formed in 1941 by the 
Southern CaliforniaJACL chapters to work with the FBI and gm'ernmental agencies to inform 
on the Japanese-American community. See id. In Seattle and San Francisco similar groups, called 
"Emergency Defense Councils," were formed. THE LIM REpORT, supra note 72, at § IB at 12. 
76 THE LIM REpORT, supra note 72, at § IA at 3-11. 
77/d. 
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(3) members acted as Government informants inside the intern-
ment camps identifying "dissidents" and "disloyals";78 
(4) the JACL leadership, including Masaoka, rather than advocat-
ing for Japanese-American interests to the War Relocation Authority 
(WRA), the governmental agency responsible for the maintenance of 
the camps, became actual employees of the WRA in exchange for 
freedom of movement?) 
(5) the JACL urged that charges of sedition be brought against 
the draft resisters of Heart Mountain;8U 
(6) the JACL considered any "no" answer to the Loyalty Oath be 
considered an expression of disloyalty irrespective of the reason for 
the "no" answer.SI 
In fact, there is evidence to the effect that in his capacity as 
Executive Secretary for the JACL, Masaoka proposed a "suicide battal-
ion" of Japanese Americans whose loyalty would be assured by having 
families and friends held by the Government as hostages.82 Even more 
disturbing was Masaoka's proposal in 1942 to recommend to the Gov-
ernment that Japanese Americans be branded, stamped, and put un-
der the supervision of the Federal Government; be placed in "labor 
concentration camps" to be utilized as "cheap labor" in the sugar beet 
fields; and that internees be used for road building in Western States 
in return for resettlement.8:1 
That this extreme "superpatriotic" response to an acknowledged 
racial injustice would be celebrated by Congress is troubling.84 Yet, in 
the clear vision of hindsight, this blindly obedient response on the part 
of the JACL could be simply written off as an understandable reaction 
to extreme and dangerous conditions. However, long after the intern-
78Id. at § lIC at 71-75. 
79Id. at § liB at 56-57. 
8°Id. at § liE at 88. Saburo Kido, the jACL president during 1940-41, wrote in the Pacific 
Citizen, the newspaper of the jACL, in referrence to the Fair Play Committee at Heart Mountain, 
"Any person ,,,ho incites or encourages any citizen to evade the draft is assuming a grave 
responsibility. It is needless to say the offense constitutes sedition." Id. 
HI THE Lm REpORT, supra note 72, at § IID at 81. The conclusions reached by the Lim Report 
were circulated to the japanese-American community after the successful redress campaign and 
caused a great controversy. See, e.g., Frank Abe, jACL Study Critical of Its Own Wartime Policies, 
THE INT'L EXA~IIXER, june 20, 1990, at 7; see also Frank Abe, Report Says Wartime jACL Leaders 
Collaborated, THE RAFU SHIMPO, june 12, 1990, at 1. 
H~ See WEGLYN, supra note 28, at 38. 
H3THE LIM REpORT, supra note 72, at § ID at 36. 
84 Ironically, given the close cooperation of the jACL with the FBI, it is remarkable to discover 
that the agency did not return the jACL's fealty to them. A wartime FBI survey of the japanese 
comnlllllity within 10 relocation camps indicated their view was that: 
One of the greatest causes for internal disorder has been perhaps the Japanese-
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ment and World War II were over, the apologia for oppressh'e govern-
mental action continued to be a consistent response from the old-line 
jACL leadership headed by Masaoka. For example, although thejACL, 
pushed by its more progressive caucuses and chapters, had adopted a 
resolution in opposition to the Vietnam War by 1972, only two years 
earlier pro-Vietnam War sentiments had been common for the old-line 
jACL activists.R5 Even more revealing is the kind of stance taken by 
Masaoka during the early campaign for redress itself. 
In the early 1970s, the jACL, propelled by the efforts of members 
like Edison Uno, adopted a series of resolutions in favor of redress 
legislation and in 1976 formed the National Committee for Redress. ill; 
However, in 1979, the jACL adopted a position supporting legislation 
for a study commission rather than supporting redress legislation it-
self.R7 As such, the jACL did not support the first redress legislation 
American Citizens League. The mem bers of the Japanese-American Citizens League 
have been very outspoken in proclaiming their loyalty to the United States. It is, of 
course, commendatory that these individuals would be loyal to this country; how-
ever, there are some indications that their views are as political as patriotic. It is the 
consensus of opinion among the Japanese that the Japanese-American Citizens 
League, in collaboration with the United States Gm'ernment, "sold them out" and 
did not put up a fight to block relocation. This feeling is so predominant that the 
Japanese now refer to Mike Masuoko [sic], the national president of the Japanese-
American Citizens League, as Moses Masuoko [sic], stating that he "led them out 
of California" [sic]. Many of the individuals ,,·ho receive beatings have been mem-
bers of the Japanese-American Citizens League, and as such are indh'iduals who 
either cooperated with the Government agencies or "'ere acti"e in sponsoring 
loyalty programs. 
/d. at § lIC at 70-71. 
85 See Official Minutes of the Japanese American Citizens League 22nd Biennial National 
Convention, at 59-60 (on file with author) (urging "rapid" end of United States participation in 
the war); see also HOHRI, supra note 21, at 37-38. Hohri describes the attempt by "sansei radicals" 
in 1970 at the JACL national convention to push the JACL to take positions against the Vietnam 
'\'ar and to take more aggressive positions on cidl rights issues, and the "outrage" by many 
members of the organization. See id. As one of those "sansei radicals," I remember, if memory 
serves, that Masaoka was reported as not being pleased with our demonstrations. 
86 See HOHRI, supra note 21, at 38,41. 
87 See id. at 44. The JACL retreat "'as an impetus for the creation of other redress organiza-
tions such as the National Council fOljapanese American Redress (NCJAR). William Hohri,JACL 
member and one of the founders of NCJAR, recalls that the reasons given for the retreat were 
"hauntingly similar" to the reasons given "for the JACL's collaboration ,,·ith the gm"ernment's 
program of exclusion and detention. Were we being sold down the river again?" /d. at 45. He 
muses: 
[T] he accommodationist role of the JACL is both symbolic and real. The symbol is 
expressed by terms such as "Quiet American" and "Model Minority" .... That's the 
direction the JACL has urged upon Uapanese-Americans] "'ith its motto, "Better 
Americans in a Greater America." The motto's corollary, also adopted by the JACL 
was "The Greatest Good for the Greatest l'<umber." The motto and corollary implied 
that "Better Americans" are more "American," and more "American" "'as ,,'hat the 
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introduced by Congressman Lowry in November, 1979.88 Indeed, at the 
Senate hearings held on the redress issue on March 18, 1980, Masaoka 
proposed an alternative-to-redress approach that would not compen-
sate indiyidual victimsY9 In a crowning irony, he "argued passionately 
against redress for renunciants and draft resisters."9u 
Thus, Congress expressed its solicitude for the very people whose 
political views accommodated and, indeed, helped to exacerbate the 
very injustice that Congress condemned by the redress bill. This con-
gressional solicitude sends an unambiguous message-there are re-
wards for acquiescence. 
In a 1997 conference held at the University of California Los 
Angeles entitled "Voices of Japanese American Redress," several 
themes emerged, as reported by the community press. The conference 
was sponsored primarily by the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund, 
and its purpose was, as one organizer stated, "to see the broad spec-
trum of ideas that still exists among the different individuals that were 
inyolved in the redress movement. "(JI One theme reported was that the 
redress moyement was an historic grassroots event.92 Another theme 
that emerged was that redress could not have been accomplished 
without the "patriotism" exhibited by the Japanese-American commu-
nity in response to their incarceration.93 
majority of Americans were: white Americans. Japanese-Americans were to become 
as much like white Americans as possible; failing that, they were to be quiet and 
accommodating. 
!d. at 12S-29. 
The other major group formed for redress pnrposes was the National Coalition for Re-
dress/Reparations (NCRR) in 19S0. See HATAMIYA, supm note 21, at 142. The various formations 
and their different strategies to attain redress are beyond the scope of this article. However, like 
any political movement, different views emerged. For some perspectives of these differences, see 
HOHRI, supra note 21, at 142-45; HATAMIYA, supra note 21, at 13S-42. 
~~H.R. 5977, 96th Congo (1979) (,The Lowry Bill"). The Lowry Bill allocated $15,000 per 
internee. This bill was opposed in testimony by ~Iasaoka before the House Judiciary Committee 
onJune 2, 19S0. See HOHRI, supra note 21, at 61,76-77. 
WI See HOHRI, supra note 21, at 64. 
~o !d. at liS. 
91 Takeshi Nakayama, Grassroots Lobbying Created Legitimacy for Redress, THE RAFU SHIMPO, 
Sept. IS, 1997, at 1 (quoting conference organizer Dr. Mitchell Maki) [hereinafter Grassroots 
Lobbying]. 
~I~~lartha Nakagawa, Redress Revisited, THE RAFU SHIMPO, Sept. 12, 1997, at Al (calling it 
"one of the greatest grassroots effort in modern American history"). 
~13 Representative Robert Matsui stated: 
There could be no question about our patriotism after people like Rudy [Tokiwa], 
,,'ho was locked up in camp went to war for the U.S. I don't think redress would 
hm'e happened without the 442nd, without those who gave up their lives and gave 
themseh'es for the war effort while their families were interned. 
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The reported discussions around this issue were disturbing be-
cause there did not appear to be any focus on the implications of and 
the dangers inherent in the notion that despite the clear injustice of 
the incarceration, congressional redress would not ha\'e been possible 
unless there had been a history of acquiescence to it. Instead, there 
was only heated discussion on what the appropriate role of the JACL 
should have been at the time of internment.94 
Whatever the merits of each position in the debate, this particular 
argument obscures and detracts from discussion of a much larger and 
more troubling issue. Even if one assumes that the JACL accommoda-
tionist course was a "better" alternative to outright resistance to the 
incarceration, the question remains whether that response should be 
what we, as a nation and community, celebrate and commemorate 
when we look back on the experience. The fact that segments of the 
wartime Japanese-American community either felt or were actually 
forced to cooperate enthusiastically with their captors should be viewed 
as a source of national tragedy as well as a testament to the Japanese-
American community's will to endure and prevail. Should not the 
lesson that we as a nation learn from the experience of Japanese 
Americans be that when it~ustice happens we should listen better to 
the dissenters and the protesters against that injustice? With that as 
our national lesson, we as a society are better assured that, in the 
future, no other community will be forced to humiliate themsel\'es in 
the face of their oppression in order to survi\'e. 
Moreover, deflecting the debate away from that issue to one solely 
over the wartime role of the JACL forces a defense of their wartime 
position which reinforces a "superpatriotic" accommodationist stance 
in the present. In response to a position articulated at the conference 
that the JACL sacrificed long-term Japanese-American interests by ca-
pitulation, Fred Hirasuna, a JACL member from central California, 
wrote: 
Those young people who volunteered or were willingly draft-
ed for military service, in spite of constitutional wrongs com-
mitted against them and their families by their own gm'ern-
ment, showed more real courage and more commitment to 
the overall cause of Japanese Americans than any other single 
Takeshi Nakayama, Rare llict01)' of SPil7t OOe/' Numb!'I'S, THE Ruu SHIMPO, Sept. 16, 1997, at A2. 
94 There are reports of a heated exchange between Frank Chin and Fred Hirasllna. Chin 
took the position that the JACL failed to defend Japanese Americans during incarceration, and 
Hirasuna took the position that cooperation with the Gm'ernlllent was the only viable alternative 
at the time. See Grassroots LobbJing, supra note 91, at 1. 
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group, more than the Heart Mountain [draft resister] 
group.95 
However, the issue should not be framed in terms of who showed 
more courage, but rather by asking why people were forced to make 
that kind of a choice, and why Congress has decided to celebrate 
one choice but not the other. Japanese Americans should not allow 
ourselves to be placed in the position of accepting reparations at 
the same price that we were asked to pay when we were incarcerated 
in the first place-accommodation of governmental racial injustice. 
Aside from its collateral pernicious effects, it places us back at our 
original humiliation. 9G 
II. THE DANGER OF POLITICAL ACCOMMODATIONISM FOR ASIAN 
AMERICANS 
The carrot of political reward for political accommodation is a 
particular temptation for Asian Americans, for Asian Americans find 
themselves in a peculiar place in the developing racial hierarchyY7 If 
Asian Americans accept their model minority role, it no doubt will 
come with the "reward" of higher racial status. AsJohn O. Calmore has 
explicitly predicted: 
I do believe, however, that dominant America will attempt to 
situate Asians, Pacific Islanders, and Latinos squarely within 
its efforts to determine who will be "white" in the twenty-first 
century.98 
In the search for more sophisticated paradigms to understand and 
dismantle all forms ofracial subordination, it is imperative not to allow 
an exploration of the subtlety of the various paradigms to diffuse the 
primary attack upon the overall operation of white supremacy.99 
95 Letter to the Editor, THE RAFU SHIM PO, Sept. 27, 1997, at 3. 
96 Since my source for the goings on at the UCLA conference are taken from press accounts, 
I am reluctant to comment upon issues that may have been unaddressed. However, it was reported 
that although there were discussions of unfinished work (i.e. the cases of Latin American Japanese 
who were incarcerated), there was no report of discussions about how and whether Japanese 
Americans could participate in and support the claims of other groups such as Hawaiians and 
African Americans for reparations and racial redress. See Nakagawa, supra note 92, at AI. 
Yi For a discussion of the "buffer" role Asian Americans often play in contemporary American 
racial politics, see infm notes 105-06 and accompanying text. 
yti John O. Calmore, ExpllJling AIichael ami's "iVles.lY" Real World of Race: An Essay for "Naked 
People Longing to Swim Free, " 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 25, 63 (1997) (quoting Letters to the Editors), 
in RACE TRAITOR 269, 275 (Noel Ignatiev & John Ganey eds., 1996). 
99 Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in 
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Professor Eric Yamamoto has articulated an analytical framework 
for understanding the operation of dominance and subordination 
outside the old Black/White paradigm without sacrificing the primary 
focus on white supremacy.lO(J According to Professor Yamamoto, situ-
ated group power involves four understandings: 
(1) simultaneity (racial group can be viewed as oppressed 
and oppressive simultaneously depending on power relation-
ships involved); 
(2) positionality (focuses on actor's "power position within 
a given context to identify its potential as an agent or object 
of domination, or both"); 
(3) differentiation (how within a system or context of racial 
domination "where racial minorities are struggling against 
white domination, a nonwhite racial group acquires and ex-
ercises power over another;" and "differential racialization 
and differential disempowerment" recognizing that racial 
groups are racialized differently such that: 
varying historical experiences and current socio-economic 
conditions create different racial images, status and power 
among racial groups, and those differences contribute to 
intergroup conflict. Both ideas account for differential racial 
group agency in the construction and maintenance of racial 
hierarchies and differential racial group responsibility for 
dismantling those hierarchies. Rooted in critical sociology, 
differential racialization and disempowerment thus acknow-
ledge that racial groups, even while themselves struggling 
against domination by others, sometimes, and in complex 
ways, exercise power over others and that this exercise of 
power occasionally generates or exacerbates interracial con-
flict.) ; 
(4) dominance/transformation (,The extent of racial 
group's power over another is determined in part by its align-
ment with other ... actors."). WI 
Post-Civil Rights Ammca, 95 MICH. L. RE\·. 821, 891 (1997) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Clitical Race 
Praxis]. In the turning away from a Black/White paradigm of race relations to a more complex 
view of racial dynamics, there are attendant political dangers for people of color. See Chris K. 
Iijima, The Era of We-construction: Reclaiming the Politics of Racia/Identit)' and Reflections on the 
Critique of the Blacll/White Paradigm, 29 COL. HUM. R. LAW R. (forthcoming 1997). 
100 See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 99, at 891. 
101 Id. at 892-93. 
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Thus, power "generates racial harms for which the more powerful 
group bears responsibility" and transformation "reflects an acceptance 
of responsibility and affirmative steps toward interracial healing."lo2 
The story that was the Prologue to this piece illustrates Professor 
Yamamoto's point with respect to how subordinated groups must un-
derstand and navigate among the myriad and complex ways in which 
subordination plays out. In fact, to meet the exigencies of contempo-
rary American race hierarchy, a more explicitly tiered rather than 
binary racial system of subordination is developing.lo3 On one hand, 
there will be a continued bottom level of subordinated people of 
color-particularly African Americans. On the other hand, there is a 
growing middle tier in which a subordinated "model minority," Asians 
and some Latinos, will be given some racial and class privileges in 
return for being used as both a buffer and a diversion. 104 
IO~ /d. at 893. 
103 See \~Ilnamoto, supra note 15, at 238 n.67 (referring to Professor Mari Matsuda's fear that 
Asian Americans could reinforce a racial hierarchy "with white on top, black at bottom, and yellow 
in the middle"). 
1lI4 See Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Aliile: Citizenship, "Foreignness," and Racial 
Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261, 311-15 (1997). See also Natsu Saito Jenga, Finding 
Ollr \ 'aices, Tea chi ng Our Truth: Reflections on Legal Pedagogy and Asian American Identity, 3 ASIAN 
PAC. A\1. LJ. 81, 83-84 (1995) (noting how the "model minority" myth places Asian Americans 
in a racial hierarchy below whites and above Mrican Americans and Latino/Latinas); Neil 
Gotanda, l"Hulticulturalism and Racial Stratification, in MAPPING MULTICULTURALISM, 238, 240 
(Avery F. Gordon & Christopher Newfield eds., 1996) (Mrican Americans measured against 
"model minority" myth). Indeed, as Frank H. Wu has stated: 
Under sOlne circumstances, Asian Americans have been granted the status of hon-
orary whites. In anomalous instances, whites may accept Asian Americans as white, 
despite de jure discrimination. Official school desegregation, for example, could 
be ignored to permit Asian Americans to attend a white institution. Nevertheless, 
there do not appear to be many, if any at all, court cases characterizing Asian 
Americans as whites, where that characterization favors the individual thus iden-
tified. 
Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor l471ite: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD LJ. 225, 248 (1995) (footnotes omitted). 
Professor Kevin Johnson has criticized Professor Saito's model of a racial hierarchy as too 
static a concept since race relations are complex, fluid, and interrelated. Kevin R.Johnson, Racial 
Hierarchy, Asian Americans and Latinos as "Foreigners," and Social Change: Is Law the Way to Go?, 
76 OR. L. REv. 347, 360-61 (1997) (conceptualizing race relations as a "solar system" in which 
positions are fixed but in different relationships to one another over time). Indeed, as Eric 
Yamamoto has pointed out, the terrain of racial domination and subordination among different 
racial groups shifts. See Yamamoto, Ctitical Race Praxis, supra note 99, at 891-93. 
Howe\"er, although group dominance shifts in different periods of time for different reasons, 
what stays as an overall constant is the dominance of white supremacist ideology, and therein lies 
the political usefulness of the hierarchy model. As Professor Johnson himself observes, it is in the 
shifting of race relations among people of color fighting for "the scraps" that white supremacy is 
assured. Johnson, supra at 362. Thus, it is of paramount importance for each subordinated group 
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This phenomenon is not without some precedent in the United 
States.105 One author, whose 1967 research focused on the relatively 
large Chinese population (approximately 1200) in the Yazoo-Missis-
sippi Delta, noted that despite the rigidly segregated nature of the 
Delta society and the social and economic gulf between dominant 
whites and subordinate Blacks, the Chinese had "managed to leap the 
chasm."106 
Originally classed with blacks, they are now viewed as essen-
tially "white." The color bar stands, but they have crossed over 
it. Moreover, in some communities they bridge it anew every 
day, for they still stand in a sense as an intermediate group. 
Negroes do not consider them exactly white; Caucasians do 
not consider them black. They are privileged and burdened 
with an ambiguous racial identity.w7 
Moreover, the eritire trend toward a separate "multiracial" racial 
census category echoes this "new" racial structure and assumes a num-
ber of false premises-that there is a "pure" Mrican-American or Lat-
ino race that is "unmixed" by other races, and that individuals are free 
to assign themselves a racial designation unaffected by how they are 
perceived in larger society. 108 
to recognize when and how it is also being used to subordinate another in the interest of 
preserving the racial status quo. The players in the middle and the bottom of the hierarchy ma)' 
shift, but it still is dangerous to deny that a hierarchy exists at all since that denial may dilute the 
focus on the elimiriation of white racial dominance for all groups. Professor Tanya Hernandez 
writes how in Latin American countries, those of mixed race act as a "buffer class" to maintain 
white supremacy. Tanya Rateri Hernandez, "J\1l1ltimcial" Discourse: Racial Classifications ill an 
Era of Color-Blind jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REv. 97,122 (1998). She goes on to speculate that the 
same motivation may help explain the interest in the multiracial category. Id. at 131. 
\1'5 See infra notes 118-25 for a discussion of Asians in South Mrica under apartheid. It is 
worth noting that japanese businessmen were accorded an "honorary white" status due tojapan's 
importance in South Mrica's economy. See, e.g., Roger Thurow, This Time, japan n'tJuld Rather 
Stay No.2, WALL ST. j., Aug. 12, 1987; jenga, supra note 104, at 93 n.26. Of course, the very 
notion of an "honorary white" serves to further codifY the notion of white supremacy since it 
"promotes whiteness as an ideal." Frank H. Wu, From Black to Whife and Back Again, 3 ASIAN L. 
J. 185,207 (1996) (reviewing WHITE BY LAw: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF R~CE). 
I06SeejAMEs W. LOEWEN, THE MISSISSIPPI CHIl\"ESE, BET\I'EEl\" BLACK AND WHITE 2 (2nd ed. 
1988). 
107Id. 
108 See Hernandez, supra note 104, at 103 (stating that multiracial categories reduce race to 
an "individual-focused assessment of fluid cultural identity") ;jacinta Ma, Census 2000 Issues Heat 
Up, THE NAPALC REV., Spring 1997, at 3 (reporting on H.R. 830 requiring federal agencies to 
provide opportunity for respondents to specify "multiethnic" or "multiracial"); see also Steven A. 
Holmes, Panel Balks at Multiracial Census Cafegol)" N.Y. TIMES, july 9, 1997, at A12 (reporting 
that while seven states have a multiracial category and nine other states are considering the issue, 
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Many children of mixed race couples are "raced" as the darker 
parent. 109 The political effect of such a new category is to create an 
illusion that racism is not part of a highly sophisticated system of 
dominance and subordination, but simply a matter of individualized 
self-naming. This further fractionalizes and dilutes the coming majority 
of color into more disparate constituencies in which there are only 
"minorities"-whites then become the largest of these minorities.lJO 
This "informal" tiering, of course, is highly reminiscent of the 
rigidly tiered structure of the now dismantled South Mrican apart-
heid. \11 Although to many of my colleagues of color the news may be 
old, and despite the outcry that the proposition might occasion by 
some of my other colleagues, it is becoming increasingly clear that as 
South Mrica has begun the arduous struggle to dismantle the effects 
of its apartheid history, America has embarked upon the creation of a 
a federal task force will recommend not including a multiracial category on federal forms such 
as the Census Bureau forms, but will recommend that an indi\'idual of mixed racial parentage 
may self-identifY and check off seyeral races simultaneously on federal demographic forms). 
President Clinton has directed his "ad\'isory panel" on race to focus on multi racialism rather than 
black/white relations. SeeJames Bennet, Clinton Renews Emphasis on "ll1.ultiracialism, "N.Y. TIMES, 
July 18. 1997, at A20. Howe\,er, the critique of the traditional black/white paradigm of race 
relations has been used by some to dh·ert attention away from the operation of white supremacy. 
See Iijima, supra note 99. 
1119 Indeed, the young golf sensation Tiger ""oods is usually referred to as being African 
American irrespecti\'e of the fact that his mother is Thai. See, e.g., Richard E. Lapchick, Lessons 
of Tiger Woods Will Not be Easy Ones, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1997, § 8 at 8 (comparing Woods' victory 
in the Masters to Jackie Robinson's breaking of the professional sports color barrier). Howeyer, 
to the extent that there is any acknowledgment of his mixed heritage at all, it is still bounded by 
racial stereotypes. In his essay, Lapchick reports that radio call-in talk shows or newspaper articles 
haye attribnted ·Woods' intelligence, family orientation, and his sense of racial perspecti\'e in his 
acknowledgment of the sacrifices and contributions of pioneering African-American golfers solely 
to his being half Asian! Id. 
JlONeil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome," in ASIAN AMERICANS 
AND THE SUPREME COURT 1087, 1087 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992). Gotanda discusses how the 
model minority image "carries an implied racial context of racial stratification and that there are 
distinct ideological messages implicit within the model minority image and racial stratification." 
See id. at 1088. The ideological message is articulated as follows: 
Under the model of racial stratification ... the economic disparities between Black 
and "'11ite ... do not appear to be a genuine social problem. The presence of more 
sllccessful Asian Americans and Latinos, located between ""lIites and African Ameri-
cans, prm·es that the social and economic barriers can be overcome and are not 
rooted in "race." Thus racial stratification sen·es to justify and legitimate existing 
racial disparities. 
/d. at 1091. 
Jll See, e.g., EUGENE P. DYORI:-I, RACIAL SEPARATION IN SOUTH AFRICA (1952). See also Saito, 
supra note 104, at 345 n.428 (obser\'ing that the social position of Asian Americans embodies the 
similar potential of Coloureds during apartheid). 
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more subtle, sophisticated brand of apartheid for the new millennium. 
Moreover, Asian Americans are a lynch pin of it. ll2 
In fact, after the year 2050, Blacks, Asians, Latinos, and Native 
Americans will attain a majority population.!!3 Whites in America are 
already visualizing themselves as a racial minority.! 14 They fear their 
status is eroding and that people of color are usurping their traditional 
positions of power and privilege.!!.'; The Supreme Court has taken these 
1120f course, yielding to the temptation to "soundbite" America's racial climate as apartheid 
comes with attendant risks. As former Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., ,,-arned about the 
inherent difficulties in comparing the approach to race in two different countries: 
[T] here is a high risk of superficiality in comparing tim separate countries during 
different eras. Indeed, to compare race issues in the United States and South Africa 
over the course of two hundred years is to enter a potential quagmire that few 
scholars have been willing to explore. 
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South Afiican Courts: Similmities and DijJe1c 
enees, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 479, 489 (1990) [hereinafter Higginbotham, Racism in Courts]; see also 
A. Leon Higginbotham,Jr., et aI., De jure Housing Segregation in the United States and South Afiica: 
The Difficult Pursuit for Racial justice, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 763, 775 (1990) [hereinafter Higgin-
botham, De Jure Housing Segregation]. Higginbotham states, "[a]lthough there are similarities in 
the racial histories of South Africa and the United States, they must be considered in light of the 
substantial differences, ... [among them] the tI,-O countries' populations, demographics, eco-
nomics, religions, cultures, and governments." Id. 
There is no attempt here to match exactly the tim nations' approaches to racial hierarchy. 
Instead, simple analogies will illustrate their diverging approaches. However, it should be empha-
sized that the single greatest difference betlveen the tI,'O countries from Higginbotham's perspec-
tive may not be as true in the near future as it is now: 
Perhaps the single most significant difference is the fact that from the inception of 
the United States, whites have constituted a numerical majority and have acquired 
a predominance of economic and political power ... [such that the] accommoda-
tion of the legitimate demands of blacks would not result in a substantial diminution 
of their power. 
Higginbotham, De jure Housing Segregation, supra at 775; see also Higginbotham, Racism in Courts, 
supra at 490-91. Conversely, gh-en the minority of South African whites, accommodating the 
demands of black South Africans would "result in the elimination of the ,,'hite monopoly on 
political and economic power." Higginbotham, De Jure HOl/sing Segregation, supra at 776, 
113 See, e.g., Brad Edmondson, The Minorit)' AlajOlity ill 2001, Al\1. DEMOGRAPHICS, Oct. 1996, 
at 16; Ramon G. McLeod, Census Shollls a Turning Point-Hispanics Increasing the Fastest, S.F. 
CHRON., Mar. 27, 1996, at A14 (citing a 1996 United States Census Bureau report estimating that 
during the 21st century the non-Hispanic white population ,,-ill become a minority). 
114""'hile the actual percentage of the white population in the United States is 74%, ,,-hites 
believe the percentage is under 49.9%. See Priscilla LabO\'itz, Immigration-JlIst the Facts, KY. 
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1996, at A15. \\11ile the actual figure for Blacks is about 12%, the white estimation 
was about 24%. See id. 
115 See Richard Morin, A Distorted Image of ivlinOlities; Poll Suggests that 1t7zat H71ites Think 
Thry See May Affect Beliefs, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1995, at AI. A telephone poll, conducted by The 
""'ashington Post, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University, inten-iewed 1970 ran-
domly selected Americans, including 802 whites, 474 Blacks, 352 Asians and 252 Latinos. Accord-
ing to the poll, 58% of whites felt that Blacks had jobs of equal or higher quality than those held 
by whites (46% of whites felt that Blacks had jobs of equal quality to those of ,,-hites, 6% said 
416 40 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 385 [Symposium 
fears and codified them in its racial jurisprudence by treating whites 
as a potentially victimized group to be protected. Wi 
White fears of declining power are illustrated by the recent voter 
initiatives in California which curtail benefits to immigrants and elimi-
nate affirmative action.l17 In Texas, where people of color are rapidly 
gaining numerical superiority, the elimination of racial preferences at 
the University of Texas Law School is a graphic indication of a desire 
to return to racial segregation, albeit in a more sophisticated way than 
during the Jim Crow era. lls Given that the explicit forms of Jim Crow 
Blacks had jobs that were "a little better" than whites and 6% stated that Blacks held jobs that 
were "a lot better"). 
In addition, unfounded fears that immigration is producing economic hardship bely the fact 
that immigration adds approximately $10 billion to the American economy due to au increased 
labor supply and decreased prices. See Robert Pear, Academy's RePOl't Says Immigration Benefits the 
U.S., N.V. TIMES. May 18, 1997, at AI. Any negath'e effects such as depressed wages or increased 
competition for low wage jobs ,,'ere "relatively small." Id. Moreover, "immigration does not have 
a decisive influence" on the economic opportunities of blacks. Id. at A24. vv11ile in such states as 
New Jersey and California immigration may account for some increased taxes, this is offset by 
immigrants helping to "pay the public costs of the aging baby boom generation." Id. Thus, "the 
vast m'\iority of Americans are eruoying a healthier economy" as a result of immigration. Id. at 
AI; see also Karen Brandon, FOTeign-Born Help U.S. Economy, Immigration G1'OUp'S Study Says, CHI. 
TRIB., July 8, 1998, at N8. In fact, the assumption of a large influx of undocumented immigrants 
from Mexico has been dramatically overblown. See Sam Dillon, U.S.-1Hexico Study Sees Exaggemtion 
of l'vligration Data, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1997, at Al ("The first formal migration study by the 
American and Mexican governments has concluded that the number of undocumented Mexican 
workers who have settled in the United States in this decade is far lower than some politicians 
have suggested, only about 105,000 a year."). 
116 See Alexandra Natapoff, Trouble in Paradise: Equal Protection and the Dilemma of Intf1'mi-
nority Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1059 (1995). Natapoff explores Justice O'Connor's opinion 
in Cit.v of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476-511 (1989) (plurality opinion), to show 
how it casts the factual circumstances simply as multiple racial groups competing as equals for 
power and wealth, recasting the notion of "minority status" as a "temporary numerically inferior 
presence in a given locale, rather than as a group subject to historic discrimination and in need 
of systemic remedy." See id. at 1075. 
l1'In Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997), a Ninth Circuit 
panel held that the California Civil Rights Initiative ("Proposition 209"), banning me use of race, 
gender, color, ethnicity or national origin in public employment, education or contracting, did 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1440. Using the familiar 
"colorblind" rationale, the court held that when "a state prohibits all its instruments from 
discriminating against or granting preferential treatment to anyone on the basis of race or gender, 
it has promulgated a law that addresses, in neutral-fashion, race-related and gender-related 
matters." Id. at 1444. For a description of an effect of anti-affirmative action measures in Califor-
nia see supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
Proposition 187 was a 1994 California ballot initiative that denied state benefits and services 
to undocumented immigrants. Enforcement of m'\ior provisions was enjoined in League of United 
Latin Citizells v. Wilsoll, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that sections of the initiative 
attempted to regulate immigration and were preempted by federal law). 
IIH After the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared unconstitutional its admissions policy 
which considered the race of an applicant, only three African Americans will be in the 1997 
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segregation are not politically viable (at least not yet), the imperative 
of continued racial subordination by an increasingly isolated white 
minority will require simultaneously sophisticated mechanisms of ra-
cial stratification and control, and the maintenance of stereotypes to 
monitor and suppress dissatisfaction by those subordinated.1I9 This 
first-year class of 500 at the University of Texas Law School. See Peter Applebome, In 2 Law Schools 
Black Enrollment Scarcely Exists, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1997, at AI. 
At the University of California at Berkeley, after the Board of Regents ban on affirmative 
action in 1995, there is only one African American entering student in the fall 1997 entering 
class of 270. See id. At UCLA Law School the projected entering number of African Americans 
is ten, a decline of almost 50% from the year before. See id. Indeed, at Berkeley, one Black student 
is a decline from twenty the previous year; at Texas the decline is from twenty-one to three. See 
id. There is also a significant decline in the number of entering Latino students at the la\l' schools 
at both Berkeley and the University of Texas. See id. These figures underscore the prediction that 
the abandonment of race as a factor in la\l' school admission would drastically affect the diH'rsity 
of law schools, barring potential students of color who \wuld both graduate and successfully pass 
the bar. See Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Dillersit)' in Legal Education: An Emlli/iral Allal)'sis 
of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. I, 52 (1997). 
In a related matter, in California, a state \I'here initiatives against immigration ha\'e suc-
ceeded, anti-Asian violence increased 80% from 1994 to 1995 in Southern California and 10% 
in Northern California. See 1995 AUDIT OF VIOLE:-':CE AGAINST ASIAN PACIFIC A\IERICA:-.IS, THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF INTOLERANCE IN A\IERICA, THIRD A.,\,NUAL REpORT OF THE NATIO:\,AL ASIAN 
PACIFIC AMERICAN LEGAL CONSORTIUM II (1995). Hate crimes against Asian Americans in the 
United States rose 17% in 1996. Aurelio Rojas, Hate Crimes on Rise Against Asian Americans, S,F. 
CHRON., Sept. 9, 1997, at A2. 
Ilg Apartheid looked "to a state based upon democratic-aristocratic concepts, that is of 
democratic processes within the fold of the white race." D"ORIK, supra note 111, at 58. Thus, if 
a traditional caste system is marked by vertical segregation, apartheid \I'as marked b~' both \'ertical 
and horizontal (territorial) segregation. See id. at 59. Apartheid's overall scheme was to reduce 
"the area of intercourse between the non-European races as \"ell as ben\'een them and the white 
race." Id. at 94. There were some attempts to classify based upon appearance: European by 
appearance and social circle, African by appearance and social circle, etc. WIDIOT G, JAMES, 
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION \NORKING PAPER SERIES #9214, GR01;P AREAS AND THE ]\'ATURE OF 
APARTHEID 26 (1992), Spouses of mixed couples were classified "do\\'l1\\'ard" and only those 
Coloureds who "passed" and had married whites \I'ere classified "up,,'ard" as white. See id. This 
strict segregation benveen populations was to provide conditions for races to develop "inde-
pendently" of each other. See id. at lSI. 
This is not to suggest that other status categories such as class or gender are not relevant 
and, in some cases, determine the ordering of hierarchy either in apartheid South Africa or the 
United States. However, in apartheid South Africa as well as in the contemporary United States, 
"[rjace, under certain conditions may become the content of class struggle since race may be the 
modality in which class is lived, the medium through which class relations are experienced, and 
the form in which it is appropriated." HAROLD ,,"OLPE, R<\CE, CLASS & THE APARTHEID STATE 52 
(1988) (quoting Stuart Hall). Wolpe describes and critiques various political theories in apartheid 
South Africa: "race reductionist theories" which assume that "within a racial group there is a 
uniform, common and equal investment in the racial ordering of the social system," id, at 12; 
"economic reductionist theories" which define interests solely in terms of class interests \I'hich, 
in turn, are entirely defined by the economic relations of production and in \I'hich race is merely 
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increased sophistication is played out on both an ideological and 
political level. 
It is interesting to note that the view toward South African Asians 
(Indians, Malays, Chinese) under apartheid was that no matter what 
their status, they were not considered an "indigenous part of South 
Africa," and the long range goal was to reduce their population. 120 
Thus, there was an attempt to lower the status of the Asian population 
"so as to offer no threat to white supremacy" in the economy of the 
South African nation. 121 The Nationalists allowed the Indian popula-
tion to own land and thus put Indians on a higher economic level than 
Africans, but allowed them no franchise of any form, thus giving them 
a political status inferior to Africans.122 
This distinction had the desired divisive political consequences.123 
On the one hand, the South African Asian population could choose 
between regarding themselves apart from the other non-European 
an external instrument for the reproduction of class interests, id. at 14-15; and "colonialism of 
a special type" or "internal colonialism" which divides society into a category of white subjects 
and a subordinate category of Black subjects and in which there are internal class divisions within 
each category but the "overriding factor is racial division." ld. at 30. 
h is beyond the scope of this article to articulate comprehensively the consequences of the 
interstices of different relationships. However, it is enough to recognize the importance of 
assessing the relati,'e position of one's group with respect to another in any given political context. 
See Yamamoto, Clitical Race Praxis, supra note 99, at 891 (acknowledging the "capacity of racial 
groups, amid changing racial demographics and socio-economic structures, to be simultaneously 
oppressed and oppressh'e, liberating and subordinating"). 
120DYORIN, supra note Ill, at 157-58. 
121 See id. at 162. 
122 See id. at 161. 
123 See id. at 169-71. Mixed race Coloureds (descended predominantly from European-slave 
unions) traditionally kept themselves apart from the Native population and, prior to the Nation-
alist victory in 1948, those who lived in Cape Province actually had certain advantages over native 
Africans such as no residential segregation, the ability to own property, the right to vote subject 
to certain conditions, and the right to hold elective local offices, although they suffered similar 
restrictions to Black Africans in other provinces. See id. at 61-63. Although Coloureds were usually 
discriminated against in employment and social practice in the vast majority of South Africa, they 
were seen traditionally as an "appendix of the European population" and an "intermediate 
nation" ,dIOse interests were more "closely allied" to those of Europeans than other sections of 
the population. lei, at 63-64. After the Nationalist victory in 1948, further restrictions were 
imposed on the Coloureds, even in Cape Province, and their interests became no longer linked 
to those of the Europeans. See iel. at 64. 
It is worth noting that before 1948 there was some view to allow limited economic and 
political participation for Coloureds, and had that been successfully done "the racial balance 
would have been significantly altered." GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY, A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY 272 (1981). It was the alienation of 
Coloureds and Asians through the harshness of apartheid, and thus the unity among the non-
white groups in opposition to apartheid, that forced whites to extend civil rights to all nonwhites. 
See id. at 273. Indeed, it has been speculated that if a more sophisticated approach to racial 
hegemony had been taken by South African whites, South Africa as a "racially diverse nation of 
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segments and thus demand equality for themselves alone or they could 
have regarded their issue as involving all non-Europeans. m On the 
other hand, Indians were resented due to exploitation by Indian trad-
ers in native areas in terms of high prices and inferior goods. 125 In 1949, 
rioting Mricans in Durban targeted Indian property and killed as many 
as 142 Indians. 12(i Thus, the racial tiering under apartheid not only 
codified the white minority's supremacy, it also divided the opposition 
to it by people of color.12i 
essentially European culture (with the whites securely entrenched as a major population group) 
would have been in a strong position to survive indefinitely .... " Id. 
124 See DVORIN, supra note Ill, at 165. 
125 See id. at 169. 
126 See id. at 168. A similar phenomenon happened in the Mississippi Delta after the assassi-
nation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968. Chinese stores in the Delta's black communities 
were hard hit. See LOEWEN, supra note 106, at 174-75. The author notes that Chinese stores were 
"safer" than white stores since Chinese had less access to police protection. See id. at 176. 
MoreO\'er, the targeting of Chinese merchants had another motivation: 
Id. 
Finally, it may be that the Chinese as a group are no,,' singled out because Negroes 
are particularly enraged by the irony of their gain in status. \\11ite grocers were 
always white. Chinese, howel'er, were once in approximately the same position as 
blacks, were once brothers in oppression .... Blacks may feel a sense of betrayal in 
the action of the Chinese. 
This sentiment is echoed again thirty years later in analyses of the violent discourse between 
the African-American and Korean-American communities: 
The African American community continues to struggle against a status quo legal 
narrative-white supremacy. The struggle at present is articulated as a violent 
discourse, and given the recent presence of Koreans in minority markets, African 
American violence inel'itably em'elops Koreans. HO\\'e\'er, Koreans per se are not 
the primary target. Rather, African Americans attack Koreans as symbols of "en-
trepreneurship." ... African Americans ha\'e suffered a long history of racial injus-
tice and economic inequality. As a consequence African Americans have reacted 
negath'ely to Koreans not only because Koreans have attained greater economic 
power, but because they present symbols of opportunities for economic success not 
available to African Americans. 
Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself': Deconstn/Cling the l'lolent Discourse Between 
Korean and African Amnicans, 67 S. CAL. L. RE\,. 15,41-42 (1993) (footnotes omitted); see also 
Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the StOl), of Afiican Al1le1ican/Korean Allle/iean 
Conflict: HOll! We Constructed "Los Angeles", 66 S. CAL. L. RE\'. 1581 (1993). 
127 See Stephen Ellmann, Law and Legitilllac), in South Afiiea, 20 L. & Soc. IKQL'IRY 407 
(1995). EHmann makes the obsenation that although Blacks, Coloureds and Asians were all 
victimized by apartheid, Coloureds and Asians were "less acutely victimized" and "'hen it came 
time to shape a new order, Coloureds and Asians gave substantial support to the National Part,' 
(formerly the "all-white champion of apartheid") and the majoritv of Africans gave their support 
to the African National Congress. Id. at 432-33. It is interesting that in a recent New \ark Times 
article, the author's questions about racism "split along racial and ethnic lines [where) ... African 
Americans tended to see the problem in much starker terms than did whites, Asian Americans 
and Hispanic respondents .... " Steven A. Holmes, 1l1an)' Uncertainties About President's Racial 
Effort, N.V. TIMEs,June 16, 1997, at A16. 
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In the present day United States, as racial tiering becomes more 
of a political necessity for white minority hegemony, there is a not-so-
subtle ideological campaign developing that focuses on two prominent 
themes: (1) the national "character" is inextricably bound with certain 
racial and cultural normative assumptions; and (2) since racial identity 
is essentially and solely an individual's choice, racism is cognizable only 
if it is explicitly practiced upon individuals. However, the reality is, as 
one commentator has expressed it: 
Regardless of how truly one is able to express one's personal 
identity, structural racism in U.S. society will persist in forcing 
people into one of the five boxes of the racial! ethnic penta-
gon [Black, White, Asian, Native American, Hispanic] for the 
foreseeable future. 
The fact that individual identity is vitally important does not 
preclude the fact that societal identity of groups is also im-
portant. Because the two are not necessarily the same, it 
logically follows that they do not necessarily have to agree. 
The way in which a person defines himself or herself is dis-
tinct from the way which society defines him or her, although 
both have important repercussions and ramifications. We 
gain nothing but confusion by trying to blend the two con-
cepts or obfuscate their distinctness. 128 
Indeed, the fact remains that "[w]hites have the option of ethnic 
identity, whereas people of color do not."129 Similarly, with regard to 
the former theme, the operating normative principle has "become one 
in which racism has disappeared except as imagined by its subordi-
nated subjects who [continue] to "suffer" in an unbelievable world-a 
color blind world of white innocence. "1:lU 
l~~ l\'ancy A. Denton, Racial Identit), and Census Categ01ies: Can Incon-ect Categolies Yield 
Correct Inforlllation? 15 LAW & INEQ.J. 83, 97 (1997). 
l~~ Id. at 91. 
I:lUCalmore, supra note 98, at 28 (quoting John O. Calmore, The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers: Contemporary Proceedings, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1764, 1776 (1993». 
Indeed, the color-blind myth confuses the ideal of an end to racial hierarchy with what 
already exists. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning to Think 
and Talk A.bout Race Again, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 1,6 (1995) (footnotes omitted). In fact, 
"[dlenial is a pervasive symptom of contemporary American racism." Id. at 8. Of course, the 
denial of reality merely perpetuates the condition of racial subordination. See Neil Gotanda, A 
Cn'tiqlle of "Our Constitution Is Colorblind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16 (1991) [hereinafter Gotanda, 
Our Constitution is Colorblind] ("Nonrecognition [of race 1 fosters the systematic denial of racial 
subordination and the psychological repression of an individual's recognition of that subordina-
tion, thereby allowing such subordination to continue.") (footnote omitted). 
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As opposed to the cumbersome mechanisms of apartheid and Jim 
Crow, "[t]oday's racism is state-of-the-art."l~l It plays upon the old fears, 
yet simultaneously legitimates and masks old white supremacist politics 
by reducing race to mere ethnicity ("in the end we're all hyphenated 
Americans"). It dresses up old concepts of white supremacy in catego-
ries of individualized opportunity, meritocracy, and universalism by 
appealing to "traditional values" and "individual responsibility."132 
This open fear of the loss of racial hegemony is by no means 
a radical fringe notion. It is simply the more decayed underbelly of 
colorblind egalitarian propaganda-the "Willie Horton" appeal to 
white supremacy.133 Its ability to foster fears of an irresistible tidal wave 
of color inundating the country is evident by noting that in the first 
months of 1997 alone, four bills and one resolution were submitted to 
131 Calmore, supra note 98, at 28. 
1321d. at 52-53. Indeed, "traditional yalues" are given a decidedly racial spin: 
As late as ]950, somewhere up to nine out of ten Americans looked like me. That 
is, they were of European stock. 
And in those days, they had another name for this thing dismissed so contemp-
tuouslyas "the racial hegemony of white Americans." 
They called it "America." 
PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION, COMMON SEl\'SE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION DISASTER 59 
(1995). Brimelow understands that race has always been defining in American politics. See id. at 
xvii ("[T]he racial and ethnic balance of America is being radically altered through public policy. 
This can only have the most profound effects. Is this what Amnicans want?") He has no illusions 
that this nation is or should be coIOl~blind. Id. at ]0 ("[Mlany modern American intellectuals 
[are 1 just unable to handle a plain historical fact: that the American nation has al,,"ays had a 
specific ethnic core. And that core has been ,,'hite."). Tints, his fears are expressly about losing 
racial hegemony. Id. at 56 ("For the first time, ,'inually all immigrants are racially distinct 'visible 
minorities.' They come not from Europe .... And, as ,,"e have seen, they are coming in such 
numbers that their impact on America is enormous-ine,itably "ithin the foreseeable future, 
they will transform it."). And what is most telling is the appeal to his 0\\"11 sense of "family 
values"-the continuing legacy of white privilege for his children: 
My son, Alexander, is a white male with blue eyes and blond hair. He has ne,"er 
discriminated against anyone in his little life .... But now public policy discrimi-
nates against him. The sheer size of the so-called "protected classes" that are now 
politically famred, such as Hispanics, ",ill be a matter of vital importance as long 
as he lives. And their size is basically determined by immigration." 
Id. at II. 
Brimelow recounts how he read a newspaper story in which a Chinese-American college 
student, when asked what grade she would gh"e America, replied that she "would gin' it an 
incomplete." He continues: 
Really. \-\'ell, my twin brother and I did ha,'e to grade America ... in the summer 
of 1967. We gave it an A +. And we still give it an A + ... ,,"hat's left of it. 
And-if only for my son Alexander's sake-I'd like it to stay that way. 
Id. at 221. 
133 See Calmore, supra note 98, at 51. Calmore astutely notes that Ronald Reagan: 
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the United States Congress to declare English the nation's "official 
language. "I 'H 
Moreover, the "neutral" themes of individual meritocracy have 
become less racially opaque. l35 The far right has "legitimate[d] its 
revived racial politics in a way that did not simply reassert white identity 
as inherent white supremacy in order to re-establish America as a white 
country" but has instead "hijacked" the notion of color-blindness for 
its own racial project and set the stage for the development of new 
right racial agendas playing on the same fears.l36 
In the infamous book, "The Bell Curve," after attempting to order 
racial intelligence, the authors intone that since inequality of intelli-
gence is a reality, "it is time for America once again to try living with 
inequality, as life is lived .... "137 It is not entirely coincidental that as 
some call for "independent development within neighborhoods," ra-
Id. 
silently incorporated aspects of the far right's racial project in order to broaden his 
support base. He recognized that the far right's appeal extended to people who 
would normally disassociate themseh'es fmm extremism. 
134 On January 7, 1997, the English Language Empowerment Act was intmduced, H.R. 123, 
to declare English as the official language of the United States Government (§ 161) and requiring 
that all "Titten communication of official Government business be in English (§ 163(a». H.R. 
123, 105th Congo (1997). 
On February 4, 1997, H.R.J. Res. 37 was intmduced in the House of Representatives pmpos-
ing a Constitutional Amendment establishing English as the official language of the United States 
to be "used for all public acts ... of the Government of the Unites States and the governments 
of the several States." H.R.J. Res. 37, 105th Cong. § I (1997). 
On February 5, 1997, H.R. 622, the Declaration of Official Language Act of 1997 was 
intmduced in the House and was essentially the same as H.R. 123, but also repealed bilingual 
\'oting requirements. H.R. 622, 105th Congo (1997). 
On February 13, 1997, S. 323, the Language of Government Act of 1997 was introduced in 
the Senate \\'hich mandated English but allowed "tenus of art" such as "E Pluribus Unum" to 
grace government documents. S. 323, 105th Congo § 165(2)(F) (1997). 
H.R. 1005, the National Language Act, was intmduced in the House on March 11,1997. The 
House looked to repeal not only the bilingual voting requirement (§ 4), but looked to terminate 
bilingual education pmgrams as well (§ 3). H.R. 1005, 105th Congo (1997). 
In addition, at least 18 states have adopted some variation of an "official English" law. See 
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 E3d 920, 927 n.ll (9th Cir. 1995) (listing Arizona, 
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawai'i, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
l\lississippi, Nebraska, North Camlina, North Dakota, South Camlina, Tennessee, and Virginia). 
135 See generally RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE, INTELLI-
GENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (199,1). 
1:16 See Calmore, supra note 98, at 50 n.145, 51-52. 
137 HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 135, at 551. In terms chillingly reminiscent of classic 
apartheid political theory, they expressly assert that the notion that a "natural aristocracy" 
governing those "less equally intellectually endowed" is a principle of the Founders. Id. at 530-31. 
What is remarkable to me about this statement is not that as slaveholders many of the Founding 
Fathers must have believed in a natural order of human hierarchy, but rather the baldness of its 
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cial segregation in residential communities remains rampant across the 
country, particularly in urban areas. 13R Indeed, given the recent anti-
immigrant and anti-affirmative action climate of white America in the 
assertion. Herrnstein and Murray end with a thinly veiled paean to the time-honored apartheid 
tradition of separate parallel developmen t of the races: 
Cognitive partitioning will continue. It cannot be stopped, because the forces 
driving it cannot be stopped. But America can choose to preserve a society in which 
every citizen has access to the central satisfactions of life. Its people can, through 
an interwea\'ing of choice and responsibility, create valued places for themselves in 
their worlds. They can live in communities-urban or rural-where being a good 
parent, a good neighbor, and a good friend \\'ill gi\'e their lh'es purpose and 
meaning. They can weave the most crucial safety nets together, so that their mistakes 
and misfortunes are mitigated and \\'ithstood with a little help from their friends. 
Id. at 551. Indeed, their political solution is a return to the idea oflocalized government in \\'hich 
everybody, it is assumed, knows their "place": 
A wide range of social fUllctions should be restored to the neighborhood when possible 
and otherwise to the municipality. The reason for doing so, in the context of this 
book, is not to save money, not even because such services will be provided more 
humanely and efficiently by neighborhoods (though we believe that generally to be 
the case), but because this is one of the best ways to multiply the valued places that 
people can fill. 
1d. at 540. 
138 See Denton, supra note 128, at 85 (noting that culTent levels of segregation for African 
Americans in large cities remain near their all-time high and show few signs of decreasing (citing 
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE r-lAKING 
OF THE UNDERCLASS 222 (1993)). 
Denton and Massey reach three conclusions: (I) residential segregation continues unabated 
in the largest metropolitan Black communities and that this spatial isolation cannot be attributed 
to class; (2) whites accept open housing only in principle but not in practice; (3) discrimination 
in housing against Blacks is widespread and at high le\'els in urban housing markets. See MASSEY 
& DENTON, supra at 109. They find that Blacks are more likely to be tolerated by whites as 
neighbors only when they constitute a small percentage of the population. Thus: 
where racial composition is such that open housing can be implemented without 
threatening white preferences for limited contact with blacks, desegregation should 
occur; but in areas where relatively large numbers of blacks imply a high degree of 
black-white mixing under an open market, racial segregation will he maintained. 
1d. at 111. The significance of race \\'as striking when applied to Caribbean Hispanics. Denton 
and Massey found that average levels of segregation among Hispanics were dictated by whether 
they were white, mixed-race, or Black in appearance. 1d. at 112-14. The authors conclude that: 
[w)hen it comes to housing and residential patterns, therefore, race is the dominant 
organizing principle. No matter what their ethnic origin, economic status, social 
background, or personal characteristics, African Americans continue to be denied 
full access to U.S. housing markets. 
]d. at 1/4. 
Fairfax County, Virginia, one of the wealthiest commullllIes in the nation (with $70,000 
annual household income which is twice the national median) recently cut \\'eifare benefits, 
blocked expansion of subsidized housing, and made it more difficult for the unemployed to get 
into public housing in the county. These actions affect mostly recent immigrants from Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa. See Eric Lipton, Discouraging the Poor in Fairfax, WASH. POST, June 29, 
1997, at Al (reporting county officials cutting benefits as a disincentive to potential low income 
residen ts) . 
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1990s, the ugly ideology of those like Herrnstein, Murray, and 
Brimelow cannot be written off as simply that of marginal right-wing 
fanatics. Moreover, what is so sophisticated about the approach is its 
lack of readily observable structure. The gender ceiling is glass, the 
bars are tantalizingly see-through, and the enforcement of status is 
through the vague uncertainties of "colorblind" judicial opinion and 
"neutral principle" rather than through the crude truncheon of codes 
and statutes. Yet, the gap between white and color, and between rich 
and poor, continues to accelerate apace. 139 
Perhaps the most tragic consequence of acquiescence to racial 
injustice is its effect on those who acquiese. The failure to resist the 
imposition of inferior status gradually becomes an acceptance of the 
logic of it: 
Every colonized people-in other words, every people in 
whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the 
death and burial of its local cultural originality-finds itself 
face to face with the language of the civilizing nation; that is 
with the culture of the mother country. The colonized is 
elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption 
of the mother country's cultural standards. He becomes 
whiter as he renounces his blackness, his jungle.140 
In April 1942, on behalf of the ]ACL, Masaoka sent a letter to 
Milton Eisenhower, the director of the War Relocation Authority, out-
lining his suggestions for WRA policy. Among these suggestions were 
some related to adjustment after the war; Masaoka wrote: 
We do not relish the thought of "Little Tokyos" springing up 
in these resettlement projects, for by doing so we are only 
perpetuating the very mannerisms and thoughts which mark 
us apart, aside from physical characteristics. We hope for a 
one hundred percent American community.l41 
IOl9 See Rich Thomas, A Rising Tide Lifts the Yachts, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1995, at 62D. The 
article reports that the wealth of 1 % of U.S. households climbed from 20% of the country's 
aggregate private assets in the mid-1970s to 35.7% in 1989. In 1969 the top 20% of American 
households received 7.5 times the income of the bottom 20%, but by 1992 they received 11 times 
the income. The median income among Black families was 54% of that for white families in 1992, 
as compared to 61% in 1969. See Barbara Vobejda, Black-White Income Gap Widens Over Two 
Decades, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1994, at A14. 
H()FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN WHITE MASKS 18 (1967). 
HI THE LIM REpORT, supra note 72, at § liB at 58-59. Indeed, of Masaoka's "colorblind" 
assumptions of a postwar American reality, \Veglyn writes: 
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Thus, the carrot of model minority status for Asian Pacific Ameri-
cans will not only be useful as a sword against other people of color; 
it will also serve as a dagger in the heart of the self-esteem of all Asian 
Americans who accept its "benefits" because the weapon may only be 
wielded in the defense of the racial status quo. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a dangerous Orwellian era of racial backlash, when virulent 
right-wing ideology is dressed up and passed off as "conservative" 
politics. It is a time when attempts to roll back the clock to Jim Crow 
are named "civil rights initiatives." It is a period in which conservative 
judicial activism, in a naked attempt to ossify society's racial and eco-
nomic stratification, is done in the name of "strict judicial construc-
tion." We live in a time when there is a highly charged battle cry against 
"political correctness." However it is shouted by those who would use 
the code words of the right-"less government," "local autonomy," 
"colorblindness," "traditional values," "personal responsibility," "neu-
tral principles," "traditional American culture"-as markers of accept-
able political and personal morality. 
Asian Pacific Americans are at a crossroads in terms of where they 
will stand in the coming era of race relations; they will either be used 
to solidity the control of white supremacy or stand as a force against 
it. In the justice that was rendered by national redress for incarceration 
lies the danger that its price will be ideological co-optation. By giving 
tribute to those who chose to acquiesce to the injustice and neglecting 
those who protested it, Congress has indicated the price of its be-
neficence. 
But the lesson of redress must be that only through resistance to 
injustice at the moment it occurs, will a tragedy like internment be 
avoided in the future. Indeed, the largest tragedy will be if we continue 
Perhaps nothing had influenced Nisei so profoundly as wartime accusations of their 
"unassimilability," innuendos that it was their clannishness and propensity to cluster 
which had helped to bring on the calamity .... The goal of jettisoning their 
japaneseness and assimilating into the larger society became a near obsession for 
them in the early postwar years. Many forced themseh'es into resettling in unknO\\1I 
parts of the country, cutting themseh'es adrift from the tight-knit society in which 
they and their parents had once found security. 
WEGLYN, supra note 28, at 274. See also HOHRI, supra note 21, at 137 (,There are a great many 
Japanese-Americans who tried to take the magic pill to dissolve their 'Jap-ness.'''). As Fanon 
describes it, when the colonized mentality robs the colonized of all sense of self-worth, the 
response is, "quite simply [I) will try to make myself white: that is, I will compel the white man 
to acknowledge that I am human." FANoN, supra note 140, at 98. 
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to slouch toward a society in which power and wealth accumulate in 
increasingly smaller concentrations; In the lacuna of time before the 
new millennium, it is incumbent upon all Asian Pacific Americans, 
particularly Japanese Americans-indeed, all people of good will-to 
continue to resist attempts to impose white minority rule. 
It is worth reminding ourselves constantly that while America may 
have been built by all its people, it still does not yet belong to all of us. 
EPILOGUE 
Recently, I overheard my father suddenly ask my eight-year-old 
son, Alan, whether he wanted to see his grandpa's war medals. I was 
surprised to hear him ask Alan this question since I never remembered 
him asking me when I was a child whether I had wanted to see them. 
My father had always seemed reluctant to talk about his war expe-
riences. Until fairly recently, he was never anxious to go to his 442nd 
Army unit reunions, remarking that he didn't "like all the patriotic 
crap that went along with them." He kept in sporadic touch with only 
one army buddy-the sole survivor, besides my father, of an ill-fated 
patrol in the forests of Italy. They exchanged Christmas cards for fifty 
years but visited each other only occasionally. In fact, my sister and I 
never met him. Still, when his friend died only a few months ago, he 
and my mother immediately made travel plans to grieve with his widow. 
It was shortly after that when my father took Alan into his bed-
room and brought out the box of medals containing his Purple Heart 
and Bronze Star, and all the other colorful bars and clusters he had 
won. Alan pinned some on, asked about others, and played with them 
in the same way he often played with shells, or coins, or figurines-by 
lining them up, comparing them, ranking them in order of which he 
liked best. When he asked about the significance of one or the other, 
my father would try earnestly to give explanations. I'm not sure 
whether Alan understood them completely. 
As I listened to the interchange, I tried to remember whether my 
father ever shared his wartime experiences with me as he did that 
afternoon with Alan. I drew a blank. I did remember, however, that 
when I reached draft age in the Sixties my father and mother encour-
aged me to protest the Vietnam War. I recalled that when I had just 
entered high school my father took me and my sister to Washington, 
D.C., in 1963 to be in the Big March. I thought back to the cold early 
dawns when he and the entire family would board the morning buses 
to Washington to participate in the national anti-war rallies. 
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I remembered how he had packed me off to Brooklyn-Oceanhill, 
Brownsville, and Bedford Stuyvesant-to work with the Mrican-Ameri-
can communities there during the struggle over community control of 
schools. He was one of the first to volunteer to work with the fledgling 
Asian Community Center twenty-five years ago. 
As I reflected, it dawned upon me that he had shown me his 
medals all along. I had been taught what he had learned from his 
wartime experiences, in the same way that my mother had taught me 
about what she had learned from her camp experiences by sharing 
with me her lifetime of organizing against anti-Asian violence, for 
workers' and immigrants' rights, and for the empowerment of women, 
people of color, and the poor. They both understood that the respon-
sibility of being oppressed is first to survive and then to resist. They 
both realized that in each battle fought against subordination we earn 
a citation in the larger struggle for dignity and equality. These are the 
medals I was shown as a child. These are the mementoes I keep pinned 
close to my heart. These are the medals I hope to pass on to Alan and 
his younger brother, Christopher. 
Alan finally took one of my father's old medals and placed it in 
his treasure collection of cards, figurines, old pennies, and found 
objects. My father put the remainders back into the box, and returned 
it to the bottom of his bedroom bureau drawer. Nothing more has been 
spoken of it since that afternoon. 
The rest is up to me. 

